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CHAPTER 8 
DWIGHT READ: TOWARDS A NEW PARADIGM
FOLLOWED BY A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE AUTHOR AND 
DWIGHT READ
Alain Matthey de l’Etang
Association d’études linguistiques et anthropologiques préhistoriques 
Paris FRANCE
Association for the Study of Language in Prehistory 
ASLIP, Massachusetts USA
a.matthey@free.fr
Here I report on Dwight Read’s theory for a paradigm change in kinship anthropology which 
entails kinship terminologies being interpreted as symbolic computational systems based on 
kin term  products. I also report on how Read argues that different conceptualizations of sib-
ling, either sibling resulting by descent from parent, or sibling viewed in terms of shared 
parentage, two cultural conceptions that are rendered – here exemplifying the masculine side – 
by the  kin term  products, S o F = B [son of father = brother] or F o B = F [father of brother 
= father), lead to respectively building up a descriptive or a classificatory terminology. The 
chapter also deals with how Dwight Read accounts for the relationship between genealogical 
tracing and the working out of kin terms using  kin term  products and how the logic of  kin 
term  products is consistent with the extension of kin terms to kin-type categories beyond the 
primary ones.  
The paper also reports on a discussion between Dwight Read and the author, initiated by 
questions and observations from the latter, regarding different aspects of Read’s reasoning. 
Not exhaustively, to be mentioned here is the way kin relationships are concretely worked out 
using kin term products, the model of the family space and the nuclear family, group marriage, 
how the conceptualization of sibling in terms of shared parentage expressed through the  kin 
term  product F o B = F [father o brother = father] relates to ethnographic data, the nature of 
the logic of kinship terminologies, the status of the structural equation S o F = B [son o father 
= brother] when used within the context of a classificatory terminology, the axiomatic nature 
of a number of  kin term  products pertaining to specific kin terminologies, the equations per-
taining to classificatory kinship terminologies that are likely to algebraically reduce chains of 
kin term s products, mapped from corresponding kin type strings, like “son of son of father of 
father of father” (S o S o F o F o F) is mapped from the collateral genealogical relations, fa-
ther’s father’s father’s son’s son (fffss or fffbss) to an irreducible kin term, here father, which 
is the one native speakers use for the said genealogical connection.  
The discussion also addresses, taking the example of ancient Chinese dialects, the ques-
tion of what should be the structural prerequisites for a transition from classificatory (Dravidi-
an) terminologies into bifurcate collateral and descriptive terminologies, a transition that is 
often posited by a number of linguists and anthropologists. Finally, the discussion deals with 
the question as to whether the kinship terminologies of the world all ultimately derive from a 
pre-dispersal African Proto-Sapiens kinship terminology. Throughout these lines of discus-
sion, the central question is raised as to why different cultural choices on how siblings are 
conceptualized were made that led to different human kinship terminologies and social struc-
tures. 
Keywords: kinship terminology and axiomatic equations, Family Space, Genealogical Space, Kin 
Term Space, generating descriptive and classificatory kinship terminologies, paradigm change  
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Forward. This article has its genesis as a draft (in French) for Chapter 8 in a book Dr. Alain 
Matthey is writing on kinship terminologies and group marriage. Dr. Matthey contacted me 
by email, saying that his Chapter 8 discusses what I’ve written regarding a new paradigm for 
a theory of kinship relations and would I be willing to comment on what he has written. I 
agreed and when I received his manuscript, I realized immediately that the depth of his dis-
cussion warranted a detailed interaction between us regarding the content of his chapter and 
what I have written regarding the reasons I think a paradigm change is needed. I mentioned 
the chapter to Dr. El Guindi, the co-editor of the Special Issues of Structure and Dynamics 
titled “Back to Kinship.” She suggested that I contact Dr. Matthey to see if he would be inter-
ested in having his chapter and any dialogue between myself and Dr. Matthey included in the 
this Special Issue of Structure and Dynamics, ”Back to Kinship III.” I contacted Dr. Matthey 
regarding her suggestion, and, on my part, I proposed that we engage in a dialogue in which 
we worked out, jointly, places where rewording might be helpful and “to include a short mini-
dialogue between us that either helps resolve the critique for the reader or makes it clearer 
precisely what is at issue and identifies any issue that needs to be addressed (by me or others) 
in future writing” (email of March 11, 2019). He agreed and this article, with its mini-dia-
logue based on our email communications and titled “Observations about Dwight Read’s the-
ory made by Alain Matthey with interlinear comments written by Dwight Read in italics” is 
the result.  
Dwight Read 
1.0	Introduction 
For the importance that it has gained in the field of kinship anthropology, for its mathematical 
approach to resolving unanswered key issues, and also for the innovative insight that it pro-
vides, the theory of terminological systems of kinship that Dwight Read and colleagues have 
developed over the years deserves a chapter in this essay in its own right.  
The author, Dwight Read, has dedicated a number of articles explaining the difference 
between so-called descriptive and classificatory terminologies, the two names for kinds of 
terminologies used by Morgan, but borrowed without slavishly keeping intact all of Morgan’s 
rationale for initiating this distinction among terminologies. What Read retains from Morgan 
is the idea that descriptive systems distinguish lineal from collateral relations whereas classi-
ficatory do not. He does not keep intact other features that Morgan argued also characterize 
the descriptive systems and thereby earned that designation.  
To ensure a good understanding of Morgan’s ideas that ground this chapter, let me 
quote once again the paragraphs where Morgan describes these two types of kinship termi-
nologies, first (1871: 12) at the linguistic level:  
The first [the descriptive system] … describes collateral consanguinei, for the most part, by 
an augmentation or combination of the primary terms of relationship. These terms, which are 
those for husband and wife, father and mother, brother and sister, and son and daughter, to 
which must be added, in such languages as possess them, grandfather and grandmother and 
grandson and granddaughter, are thus restricted to the primary senses in which they are here 
employed. All other terms are secondary. Each relationship is thus made independent and 
distinct from every other. But the second [the classificatory system] …, rejecting descriptive 
phrases in every instance, and reducing consanguinei to great classes by a series of apparent-
ly arbitrary generalizations, applies the same terms to all the members of the same class. It 
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thus confounds relationships, which, under the descriptive system, are distinct, and enlarges 
the signification both of the primary and secondary terms beyond their seemingly appropri-
ate sense.  
And secondly (1871: 13), at a structural level: 
In the [descriptive] system …, the collateral lines are maintained distinct and perpetually 
divergent from the lineal …. On the contrary, in the … [classificatory system], the several 
collateral lines, near and remote, are finally brought into, and merged in the lineal line ….  
Read (2018a: 64) argues that Alfred Kroeber’s rejection (1909: 77-84) of Morgan’s distinction 
between descriptive and classificatory terminologies, based on the contention that all systems 
are classificatory, one way or another, results from a misreading of Morgan. Morgan’s distinc-
tion, Read writes (2018a: 64): 
Is not based on whether kin terms (Read’s emphasis) are descriptive or classificatory (Kroe-
ber’s misreading), but whether the terminology structurally and consistently distinguishes 
between collateral genealogical relations (Read’s emphasis). Morgan was fully aware that 
English terms such as English uncle and aunt are classificatory in Kroeber’s sense, yet the 
English terminology is descriptive in his schema since the kin terms with lineal genealogical 
referents do not include collateral referents.  
This quote ends with a footnote (2018a: 64, note 5) where Read indicates that Morgan (1871: 
32-3) stated that the everyday use of uncle, cousin, cousin’s son etc., in the second collateral 
line revealed 
a tendency to avoid the full descriptive phrases. It is evident from the present structure and 
past history of the English system … [that] an uncle was described as father’s brother, or 
mother’s brother (italics in the original).  
It certainly makes sense, saying as Read does, that what matters first, while distin-
guishing descriptive from classificatory terminological systems, is that collateral lines are 
maintained separated from the lineal or conversely that they converge into the lineal.  
Kroeber’s (1909: 77) argument is absolutely reducing. While declaring as fallacious 
Morgan’s distinction between descriptive and classificatory terminologies, yet then by arguing 
that all systems are classificatory, to a varying degree, because kinship terms are potentially 
subject to designating several different categories of kin and degrees of relationship (like for 
instance, the terms uncle and aunt in English, which designate several categories, consan-
guineal as well as affinal), Kroeber performs a sleight-of-hand. This consists in making Mor-
gan’s first point – which is not absolutely accurate as we mentioned in chapter 1 – appear to 
be the essential feature distinguishing kinship systems, then conjuring away the second by 
bringing it down on the sly as a criterion among 8 different criteria making up kinship termi-
nologies, thus reducing Morgan’s definition (Kroeber 1909: 77) to a simple difference be-
tween systems that: 
… group together distinct relationships and call them by one name, and are therefore classi-
fying … 
and systems that: 
… indicate secondary differences of relationship by descriptive epithets added to their pri-
mary terms and … [are] therefore descriptive.  
thus, belittling the initial significance of Morgan’s structural level, making it appear as if it is 
just a feature, or criterion, among other same-level criteria that any given terminology may or 
may not display, like the recognition of the difference of age within one generation, or 
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whether the sex of the speaker has any importance in the way that the terms are employed 
etc.  1
Yet, what leads to confusion, and also gives rise to criticism – such as, notably, the 
criticism from Kroeber– is to use the term “descriptive” (a designation, in sum, not very con-
sistent) for a terminology whose primary distinction is to maintain separate the different de-
scent lines. This term, though leading to confusion, is, however, the one that History has re-
membered.  
Read (2013: 1) also indicates that the distinction, established between the two systems 
of kinship terminologies and based upon these principles, was not totally relevant in view of 
the remarks that Morgan himself formulated (1871: 267-77) with respect to the Eskimo Sys-
tem,  where: 2
… lineal and collateral positions are distinguished in the middle three generations but not for 
more distant generations so that, for example, the child of one’s 'niece’/‘nephew’ – a collat-
eral relative, is referred to as ‘granddaughter’/‘grandson’ – a lineal relative. 
So much for the different classification types elaborated since the time of Morgan and refer-
ring, as Read says (2013: 2), for the most part, to terminological surface differences, with the 
latter based fundamentally on the assignation of kin terms to relations of genealogical connec-
tions and not to the structural properties that “generate those surface differences.”  
It is precisely to these generative structures, that Read, often in collaboration with oth-
er scholars, has dedicated most of his endeavor, culminating in a theory, which is not easy to 
explicate without running the risk of betraying their intellectual approach.  
In this chapter, my aim is to account for the chain of reasoning developed by Read in a 
paper published in 2007, entitled Kinship Theory: A Paradigm Shift,  an argument that was 3
then resumed and expanded in collaboration with Michael Fischer and Frederic Kris Lehman 
(Chit Hlaing) in another paper published in 2014 in the French journal l’Homme, whose title 
is The Cultural Grounding of Kinship: A Paradigm Shift (Read et al. 2014). When necessary, I 
 Kroeber listed 8 same-level categories or criteria that the different terms from one given terminology are likely 1
to meet and which are based on a number of intangible principles such as the difference between lineal and colla-
teral relationship (criterion n° 2), the difference of age within one generation (criterion n° 3), the sex of the spea-
ker (criterion n° 5) (italics in the original), etc. Thus, Kroeber argued, all kinship systems may be compared to 
each other on the basis of these criteria and each of them, he claimed, is involved to some extent in the different 
terms of each terminology. This leads to an analysis that focuses on the number of terms in a terminology that 
meet positively or negatively any relevant criterion. The criterion (n° 2) that we are considering here concerns 
the fact that one term addresses lineal or collateral lines. If it does, then this category will be considered as rele-
vant (“operative”) for the term considered. If it does not, this category will be irrelevant (“inoperative”). The 
cumulative results will indicate how many terms within one system will meet this particular criterion. In this 
respect, both the kinship terminology of the Yuqui Amerindians of North America and the English terminology 
will be considered equivalent because each and every one of the terms of these two terminologies, designate 
either collateral or lineal relations, versus the Dakota terminology which has a number of terms not distingui-
shing the different lines. This way of presenting things, putting on the same level what are very different fea-
tures, is supposed to elevate the quality of sequences of comparison, but one conclusion drawn in Kroeber’s pa-
per is that “the fundamental difference between systems of terms of relationship of Europeans and American 
Indians is that the former expresses a smaller number of categories of relationship than the latter and expresses 
them more completely” which does not say much about the reason why the terminologies are like this.  
 It would be judicious, made here as an aside and with regard to the amount of ethno-linguistic data that has 2
been accumulated with respect to the different branches of the Eskimo language-group, for a linguistic and se-
mantic reconstruction of the proto-Eskimo terminology to be carried out.
 In the present paper, I will mention the pagination from the UCLA Previously Published Works series: https://3
escholarship.org/uc/item/93c7072g.
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will refer to the book that Read published in 2012: How Culture Makes Us Human: Primate 
Social Evolution and the Formation of Human Societies, and also to a book he published the 
same year, written in collaboration with Murray Leaf: Human Thought and Social Organiza-
tion: Anthropology on a New Plane. On the way, I will also take into consideration two papers 
published more recently by Read. The first one, an encyclopedia article published in 2015, 
Formal Models of Kinship, and the second one in a collective book (2018) edited by Warren 
Shapiro in Memory of Harold W. Scheffler, in which he makes a point of showing how the 
paradigm change that he consistently calls for, helps explain the difference between descrip-
tive and classificatory terminologies, and especially the nature of, and justification for, the 
semantic extensions inherent to kinship terminologies, especially the classificatory terminolo-
gies.  
In all of these publications, Read and his collaborators stress the necessity to reconsid-
er the idea, still prevalent in kinship anthropology, according to which the kinship terms 
would be:  
… primarily names for already established categories of genealogical relations (Read 2018a: 
63). 
2.0  kin term  product	
Dwight Read (2007: 5-6, 2018a: 73-74, among other publications), argues that countless 
ethnographical evidence testified, and still testifies, to the way speakers of one given language 
– indeed, probably for all languages – compute the kinship relations that link them to other 
speakers through kin terms without having the faintest idea of the genealogical connections 
involved. In other words, when a given individual knows what kin term is used by one of his 
kin to designate a third person, he will immediately know what term he himself should use to 
refer to the latter. Read (2018a: 79) noted that Scheffler and Lounsbury (1971: 141-42) al-
ready stressed that people learn how to classify their relatives without being told anything 
about the genealogical connections that they have with them:  
A person from a society with an Iroquois-type terminology may deduce … that any man 
whom his father calls … ‘brother’ is to be called ‘father’ and the son of any man he calls fa-
ther is to be called ‘brother’ …. Thus, when he encounters a man whose father is (or was) 
called ‘brother’ … by his father, he knows that man is his ‘father’ (or rather his ‘classificato-
ry father’) and he knows that man’s son is his ‘brother’ (or rather his ‘classificatory 
brother’). He need not inquire into whether the former is his father’s long-lost brother or his 
father’s FBS, or his father’s FZS etc., in order to know how to classify him…. 
This faculty of generating kin terms using other kin terms has been formally defined by Read 
(1984: 422) as a kin term product, and given a general wording that brings altogether its for-
mal characteristics (2007: 6): 
Let K and L be kin terms in a given kinship terminology, T. Let ego, alter1 and alter2 refer to 
three arbitrary persons each of whose cultural repertoire includes the kinship terminology, T. 
The kin term product of K and L, denoted K o	L, is a kin term, M, if any, that ego may (prop-
erly) use to refer to alter2 when ego (properly) uses the kin term L to refer to alter1 and alter1 
(properly) uses the kin term K to refer to alter2.  
This operation, or mode of computing, has also been given a triangular graphic version (1984, 
2018a: 76, Figure 1, among other publications). Let’s take the example that Read frequently 
mentions, with alter1, called father by speaker and calling alter2, father. 
First in its graphic form: 
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Then, using the algebraic version: 
K o L = M  
with o	= ‘of’ being the connector (or preposition) between kin terms, thus father o (of) father 
= grandfather. Read (2018a: 80) makes it clear that  
… the connector, ‘of’, in the  kin term  product of a pair of kin terms, may be interpreted as a 
binary operator [italics in the original]  [my note] acting over each pair of kin terms [mak4 -
ing up a kinship terminology].  [my note]  5
Read (2007: 6, 2018a: 74) provides a substantial list of publications documenting how kinship 
relations are computed on the ground, using kin terms, throughout the world, all showing sim-
ilar cognitive processes, and he quotes a number of field situations taken from Radcliffe-
Brown (1913) regarding the Kariera from Australia, Marshall Sahlins (1962) regarding the 
Moala Fijians, Anthony Good (1981) for the Kondaiyankottai Maravar from Southern India, 
Clifford Behrens (1984) for the Shipibo from the Amazonian Peru, Stephen Levinson (2006) 
for the people from Rossel Island, Laurent Dousset (2005) for the Ngaatjatjarra from Western 
Australia, and many other authors. I will only refer here to two examples, quoted by Read, 
illustrating this computing procedure. The first one is taken from Levinson (2006: 26), quoted 
in Read (2007: 6): 
Kinship reckoning on Rossel Island does not rely on knowledge of kin type strings […] 
What is essential in order to apply a kinterm to an individual X, is to know how someone 
else, of a determinate kin type to oneself, refers to X. From that knowledge alone, a correct 
appellation can be deduced. For example, suppose someone I call a tîdê ‘sister’ calls X a 
tp:ee ‘my child,’ then I can call X a chênê ‘my nephew’, without having the faintest idea of 
my genealogical connection to X. 
 Michel Gofman, a good friend of mine, while reading this chapter, wondered whether this operator was com4 -
mutative or not. Read answered that the  kin term  product operator is non-commutative for most kin term pairs. 
 Dousset (2008) presents details about the procedure followed by Ngaatjatjarra natives from Central Australia 5
when computing their mutual kinship relations by building a model taking the form of a “relational 
triangle” (Dousset 2008: 263, 272, 273 notably) that reflects “the indigenous principles underlying their repre-






Figure 1: Graphic version of the  kin term  product 
father o (of) father. One should not forget that this kin 
term starts with K; that is to say, from the term alter1 
uses to refer to alter2.
The second, a well-known one, is taken from Radcliffe-Brown (1913: 150-51) and quoted in 
Read (2018a: 73). It shows how Kariera speakers from Western Australia compute their kin-
ship relationships: 
Let us suppose, as an example, that two men A and B, meet each other for the first time. The 
man A has a relative C who is his mama. At the same time, C is the kaga of B. It immediate-
ly follows that A and B are kumbali to each other [italics in the original]. 
Scheffler & Lounsbury (1971: 140) stressed, relying on their own experience, that competent 
informants, when asked about the meaning of the kin terms that they used were likely to an-
swer using a “relative product.” For example, when asked “what is a cousin” they might re-
ply:  
My cousins are the children of my uncles and aunts…. 
These two authors (1971: 143) continued by saying that most anthropologists since Morgan 
and Fison, had collected lists of relative products, but rather than having picked them out in 
the field, they had deduced them from “data gathered by the genealogical method.”  Similarly, 6
they emphasized that, although informants are generally seldom inclined to verbalize such 
statements, it is the 
… anthropologist’s task to record and then order them into a workable and coherent whole. 
(1971: 144).  
Referring to Murray Leaf (2006), Read (2018a: 76, note 13) observes that  kin term  products 
can be systematically obtained from native informants, and gives the example of Punjabi 
speakers. Leaf (1971, 2006: 310-13) reports how the Punjabi kinship terminology can be built 
up by associating native informant knowledge and participation. The first step is to culturally 
identify the most commonly used kin terms (a total of 6): bāp ‘father,’ mā ‘mother,’ bhai 
‘brother,’ bhain ‘sister,’ pūtar ‘son,’ pūtri ‘daughter’ and to use each of them, in turn, as the 
basis for starting the kin term computations, with the informants being asked questions like:  
What is the […] of bhai ? (Leaf 1971: 547), (with […] being a primary kin term, my empha-
sis)  7
or 
What is your ma’s bap to you ? (Leaf 2006: 311)   8
This process furnishes new positions (kin terms) which in turn becomes the basis for new 
computations, and the result of all of these queries – here I simplify – is a culturally salient 
(validated) kinship term chart. 
If it were still necessary to demonstrate any further that things work like this, i.e., that 
kin term computing is culturally salient, and, according to Scheffler & Lounsbury’s wording, 
“psychologically and cognitively real,” I would reproduce in toto the enlightening dialogue 
 The method systematized by Rivers (1900, 1910), based on exhaustive recording of familial genealogies and 6
other ethnographical data, enabling a thorough sociological study of human communities. Rivers (1900: 77-8) 
points out that this also makes it possible to study the kinship system structure by recording the terms of rela-
tionships that given individuals apply to other community members.
 What is the […] of brother ?7
 What is your mother’s father to you ?8
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recorded in the field by Von Sturmer (1981: 13) that Dousset quoted in his 2008’s article.  The 9
context is a meeting between two aboriginal fellows belonging to different local groups – ap-
parently belonging to the Lama Lama ethnic group from Northern Queensland –, who never 
met before and who were looking for their mutual kinship relationship, if any:  
Mareeba man: ‘Where you from ?’ 
Mickey: ‘I’m Edward River man. Where you from ?’ 
Mareeba man: ‘I’m Lama Lama man … do you know X ?’ 
Mickey: ‘No. Do you know Y ?’ 
Mareeba man: ‘No. Do you know Z ?’ 
Mickey: ‘Yes. She’s my aunty.’ 
Mareeba man: ‘That old lady’s my granny. I must call you daddy.’ 
Mickey: ‘I must call you boy. You give me cigarette.’  (my note) 10
Here we have, under its most limpid and direct form, an ordinary verbalized indigenous se-
quence implying a computation of a kin relation between two individuals who had never met 
before, but who have a mutual connection to a third one,  a situation that has occurred and 11
still occurs in innumerable occasions in the daily life of people of the world, even if they are 
not directly recorded by ethnographers. Needless to say, kin term computing of kinship rela-
tions is not specifically attached to situations in which people don’t know each other, but reg-
ularly occurs in our own life:  
- Well mum, is Simone my cousin ?  
- Yes dear, she is the daughter of your great uncle Joseph.  
Dousset (2008: 273) makes this profound remark: 
The relational triangle provides a procedure or algorithm, as well as a cognitive model re-
flecting how people do in fact determine the kin category in which they stand to each other 
without genealogical knowledge being a condition. It is not a formal or structural model, but 
the abstraction of what I believe to be mental representations; and, in this sense, it is also an 
emic heuristic model. 
which clearly establishes the kind of relationship existing between the model and the indige-
nous mental representation.  
 I haven’t been able to get access to Von Sturmer’s paper. Theo Van Leeuwen (2008: 44) also quoted this situa9 -
tion.
 Mareeba is the aboriginal name for a city and a county in North-Eastern Queensland to the west of the coastal 10
city of Cairns. The Edward River is situated in the north-eastern part of Cape York Peninsula (Queensland). 
Lama Lama is a native designation now associated with several languages (groups) within this region, like 
Umbindhamu, Umbuygamu, Mba Rumbathama or Lamu lamu, etc. 
 Dousset (2008: 273, Figure 3) gives two other hypothetical triangular situations. The first one involves two 11
Ngaatjatjarra women, ego and A, that never met before and a man B. Ego calls B kamuru (‘mother’s brother’), B 
calls A yurntalpa (‘daughter’), therefore ego and A reciprocally call each other watjirra (‘cross-cousin’). In the 
second example, ego calls B ngunytju (‘mother’), B calls A (a man) watjirra (‘cross-cousin’), therefore ego calls 
A mama (‘father’). The author (2008: 272), emphasizes that “in order to determine the relationship between two 
unrelated persons, a third and intermediary person is necessary,” and he goes on to designate this person as the 
“nodal point” or “connector” (italics in the original).
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The fact that this modus operandi (the products of kin terms) appears as culturally 
salient and apparently universally distributed suggests to Read (2012: 14-15, 2018a: 77) that a 
kinship terminology neither simply consists in a list (a collection or an addition) of vernacular 
kin terms corresponding to categories of genealogically “predetermined” relationships, as it is 
generally assumed, nor is it modeled on the logic of biological relations,  but represents: 12
[…] a conceptual system that expresses what are the kin relations as they are understood in a 
particular society and how kin relations may be computed among the individual sharing the 
same kinship terminology (Read 2007) […] (Read 2012: 15). 
This system  
… has an underlying computational logic that enables culture bearers to make  kin term 
computations in a consistent and noncontradictory manner without reference to genealogical 
definitions of kin terms (Read 2018a: 77). 
3.0	Towards a Paradigm change 
Read’s conclusion (Read 2007: 3-4) is thus that it is time to make a paradigm change,  which 13
is to say, reconsider the idea that kinship systems and kinship in general are built upon ge-
nealogical ties. Read (2007: 4) sums up the old paradigm as follows: 
The kin terms are interpreted as linguistic labels for the kin type categories. In this frame-
work, any structure among the kin terms is the consequence of external processes, such as 
constraints on behavior arising for both social and ecological reasons, that determine a parti-
tion of the genealogical space into categories of kin types. Hence causality would be from 
behavior to the distinctions made in the kinship terminology. 
This point is very important. It implies that the structural features of a given system, for ex-
ample, the fact of calling father the brother of your father, or the fact of calling – were you a 
man – son the son of your brother, should not anymore be interpreted, as Morgan thought was 
the case, as linguistic reflections of the former existence of group-marriage between brothers 
and women potentially sisters to each other, but not only this, neither it should be thought of 
as the result of the enforcement of structural extension rules, as Scheffler, Lounsbury and 
many others thought it was, but to the contrary, it should be viewed as the very consequence 
of the internal logic inherent to the kinship terminology itself.  Read (2007: 2-3) and Read et 14
al. (2014: 64) believe – we already pointed this out – that consensual social anthropological 
theories have, most of the time, only provided descriptive accounts of kinship terminologies, 
 Genealogical and biological relationships are obviously not of the same order. Traditional genealogical tracing 12
starts from the supposition that all the relatives descending from common ancestors are altogether tied by con-
sanguineous chains, without caring about the true genetic links that might connect them. The application of DNA 
research to the familial sphere has upset the deal, notably making possible paternity investigations, until then 
problematic. 
 Paradigm in the sense of model. But Leaf and Read, in the common preface and introduction to their book, 13
Human Thought and Social Organization (2012: XV and 2, 6), consider that this wording does not reflect their 
approach in its globality, an approach that they believe is closer to the working-out of a new science.
 Read (2018a: 79) underlined that Scheffler & Lounsbury acknowledged that kinship relations were not simply 14
computed from genealogical ties, but from relative products of kin categories (Read reads kin terms products), 
but notes that they did not explore the logic underlying the latter.
 143
not explanations for their structural differences.  They have stressed, consequently, the ne15 -
cessity of elaborating a new paradigm, capable of defining kinship and accounting for the 
structural properties of kinship terminologies (Read 2007: 4): 
The new paradigm reverses this sequence by beginning with kin terms viewed as cultural 
constructs, including culturally determined computations for linking kin terms to one another 
subject to structural constraints and thereby forming a structured system of kin terms. Kin 
terms can then be linked to categories of kin types through the kin term structure, thereby 
producing a structured system of kinship categories that provide genealogical definitions for 
kin terms. I call the process through which the kin terms are linked to categories of kin types 
cultural instantiation … 
Thus, Read postulates the primacy of the terminological system over the genealogical com-
puting and makes the latter depends from the former. As he puts it (2007: 12), the explanation 
shifts from a research of external conditions that could have possibly motivated the structure, 
to an identification of the generative logic that underlies it.  
4.0 Primary terms and mapping of kin terms 
Read (2018a: 80) writes: 
Viewing a kinship terminology as having an algebraic structure (Read 1984) is culturally 
salient and leads to analyzing a kinship terminology as a symbolic, computational system 
based on the  kin term  product. 
This logic embedded in any given kinship terminology enables us to generate or to engender 
all the kinship terms and thus all the kinship relationships that the terminology may actually 
conceive, acting on  kin term  products starting from primary terms – we will return to this 
designation shortly. This structural logic, or internal computing logic, that Read (2018a: 80) 
refers to as forming an “abstract algebra,” is made tangible by “empirically” building up what 
Read (2007) and Read et al. (2014), among other papers, labeled as a “kin term map,” thus a 
graph representation (formalization) of the  kin term  products generating all the kin terms 
making up a kinship terminology and thereby forming a kin term space,  beginning by repre16 -
senting the primary kin terms from the self position and pursuing by products of these primary 
terms, one by one with each other, generating new terms which in turn are made into  kin term 
products and so on.  The kin term space thus encompasses the totality of the terms generated 17
using  kin term  products and made concretely visible by means of geometrical representa-
tions.  
Like Morgan, Read (2018a: 77) calls primary the terms designating the kinship rela-
tionships from the first familial circle (the primary relationships), all of them conceived from 
 I give, once again, the excerpt in extenso (Read et al. 2014: 64): “The formal methods of componential analy15 -
sis, rewrite rules [to which he adds] the recent appeal to optimality theory from phonemics (Jones 2010) only 
provide us with descriptive accounts of kinship terminologies, not the reasons for differences between them 
[…]”
 Read et al. (2014: 71) explain what they mean by kin term space and kinship terminology: “(the kin) terms 16
form a kin term space in which symbolic computations [i.e., computations of kin terms] circumvent the cognitive 
limitations [of genealogical calculus]. We call the ensemble of kin terms making up a kin term space a kinship 
terminology.” 
 the AKT (American Kinship Terminology) map, See the terminology used by American speakers, see also the 17
map of the Shipibo, a Panoan language from South America (Read 2007: 8-9: Figures 1 and 2), and the map of 
the Kariera, an Australian language that we already mentioned (Read et al. 2014: 75, Figure 5).
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speaker and known as being those of parents (or father and mother), spouse (or husband and 
wife), child (or son and daughter) and sibling (or brother and sister). These relationships are 
built up on marriage ties and reproductive criteria in use within a given culture (see the family 
space paragraph). One of the properties attached to these kin terms, also justifying their appel-
lation, is that they cannot themselves result from a  kin term  product, but that it is, from them, 
and through their mutual products, that other (non-primary terms) are generated, those being, 
in turn, put into product with the first ones, engendering, in an ascending and descending gen-
erational manner, a kinship terminology, composed, as an average, of between 15 and 25 
terms (Read et al. 2014: 71). This assertion, though, needs further elaboration as concerns sib-
ling terms. In effect, Read argues that the sibling relationship can be conceptualized in two 
ways, depending on whether a sibling is considered as ‘child of parent’, thus via the parent-to-
child relationship, which is formulated by the  kin term  product: 
… child (of) parent = sibling (Read 2007, Read et al. 2014, Read 2018a), 
or as a relationship directly linked to self and indirectly to parents. In the first instance, the 
sibling term is in no way a primary term; in the other instance, it is a primary term, thus a 
generating term (though not the only generating term) for the kinship terminology. Most of 
Read’s theoretical endeavor has consisted in demonstrating that the difference between a clas-
sificatory and a descriptive system is that the sibling terms are or aren’t primary (or generat-
ing) terms within a given terminology (Read 2018a: 102). I will address this issue below.  
To these primary terms, one needs to add the central position of self, or myself, consid-
ered as a same level generating element with the other primary terms. So, according to Read, 
the American terminology only needs (my)self, parent (father and mother), child (daughter 
and son) and spouse (husband and wife) in order to be empirically generated using  kin term 
products (Read 2018a: 98) and graphically represented (Read 2007, 2012, 2014, 2018a). 
Read carries the argument a bit further (2018a: 83) by saying that one needs to consid-
er that the symbolic system constituting a kinship terminology is based not only on the  kin 
term  product logic, but is also  
Integrated with fundamental kinship concepts such as reciprocity of kin terms. 
We will also return later to this property.  
5.0 Scheffler, Lounsbury, Read and the  kin term  products  
At this point, it seems to us crucial to open a parenthesis that sheds light on what makes the 
difference between Scheffler & Lounsbury’s analysis on the one hand and Read’s on the other 
hand, regarding the cultural and cognitive status of  kin term  products, labeled by the two 
first authors as ‘relative products’ (of kin classes). Obviously, the three authors agree on 
claiming that these computing statements are emitted without the speakers having to mobilize 
their genealogical knowledge whatsoever, as is reported in the example quoted earlier regard-
ing how users of Iroquois-type terminologies -- taken as an example by Scheffler & Louns-
bury (1971: 141- 42, quoted by Read) -- compute their kinship relationships.  
Yet Scheffler and Lounsbury (1971: 143) warned against any suggestion that these 
“relative products” could be more  
psychologically and cognitively “real” than the other symbolically more elaborate [my em-
phasis] treatments of systems of kin classification.  
i.e., the componential or the extension rules analysis, (Scheffler & Lounsbury 1971: 141).  
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While they abstained from belittling the intrinsic value of relative products worked out 
‘in the field’, even recommending that anthropologists should “make a great deal more use” 
of statements that informants are likely to volunteer, these were clearly assigned a secondary 
cognitive status, like that of one’s folk grammar when compared to linguistic discourse. Thus, 
they suggested (1971: 143-44) that they should be judiciously used as a means to “validate a 
formal semantic analysis,” for  
If an analysis is valid it should turn out that its posited definitional and extension rules can 
be paraphrased in terms of the rules volunteered by informants [i.e., the kin term products] 
(Scheffler & Lounsbury 1971: 144).  
This is precisely the type of test case that the two scholars developed with the kinship termi-
nology of the Siriono natives from Bolivia (1971: 144-47) by putting up a list of plausible rel-
ative products that they thought any “intelligent” Siriono could have volunteered, covering all 
the primary and extended range of kintypes “denotable by the terms.” I say plausible because 
no Siriono informant was present to validate these products by saying them. And they con-
cluded that as far as Siriono daily needs are concerned, these statements constituted a consis-
tent whole, allowing for correct computations of kin terms. The question was then (1971: 147-
48): Why bother with formal analysis if Siriono speakers (and more generally any native 
speaker) work out correct relationships while computing their vernacular kin terms? David 
Kronenfeld (1980: 166) made pretty much the same point in his conclusion regarding his ‘F’ 
analysis of the terminology of the Fanti from Ghana.   18
Scheffler and Lounsbury then argued (1971: 148), first that the list of ‘native’ defini-
tions and relative products was nothing more than a “paraphrase of the formal semantic analy-
sis,” notably elaborated in the chapters 4 and 5 of their book, and second, that this paraphrase 
expressed a  
… degree of particularity and redundancy that is not characteristic of the other.  
Thus, every particular native statement expressed specifically (thus incompletely) what the 
structural rewrite rules formulate in universal terms. Statements like “the children of my 
brothers I (being a man) call them children or more exactly, I call the children of anyone I call 
brother, children,” or also “I (being a woman) call the children of anyone I call sister, chil-
dren,” are just particular cases, covered by a higher-level rule, i.e., the same-sex (as speaker) 
sibling merging rule. 
Scheffler & Lounsbury (1971: 148-49) conclude that all specific vernacular rules, ap-
pearing as having the form of  kin term  products, with or without an extensive character, con-
sequently appear to have a cognitive and psychological value of limited scope, and also that 
an analysis that does not bring forward systemic rules global in scope, like the same-sex (as 
speaker) sibling merging rule, is indeed incomplete, as it  
… has not yet revealed the fundamental underlying principles of the system (Scheffler & 
Lounsbury 1971: 148). 
 Kronenfeld realized two different analysis of the Fanti kinship terminology. The first one, of Lounsburian 18
inspiration, was based on equivalence rules and then called the ‘L’ analysis. The second one, the ‘F’ analysis (F 
for Fanti), was defined by Kronenfeld (1980: 159) as “a formalisation of the logic contained in the relative prod-
ucts by which Fanti explained or justified their terminological assignments of kinsmen.” The author’s conclu-
sions (1980: 164-65) were that the ‘F’ analysis was psychologically real “in the sense that it very directly repre-
sents what […] informants did in their heads when they themselves calculated correct kinship relations, that is, 
‘correct’ denotative usage.”
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The two authors (1971: 149) establish that both sets of rules – the vernacular and those result-
ing from semantic analysis – are formally equivalent because both have the same descriptive 
value, yet only the latter possesses an absolute value. In their very conclusion of their chapter 
7 (1971: 150), they claim that:  
The psychological or cognitive status of the definitional and equivalence rules posited in 
Chapters 4 and 5 should now be fairly clear; it is highly probable that they are general struc-
tural principles [my emphasis] underlying and relating a number of more specific relation-
ships between terms and the kin classes they designate.  
As I indicated in Chapter 7, it is precisely this ontological status that Dwight Read denies to 
such rules, therefore depriving them, from any explicative value, allocating it, in turn, to the 
formal logic inherent to vernacular  kin term  products, themselves able to account for the 
structural differences between the descriptive and the classificatory systems.  
Read (2018a: 70-2), in problem 3 (cultural saliency), gives an account of Kronenfeld’s 
(1980 [2009]) analysis of the Fanti (see my preceding footnote), noting that the author con-
cluded that only the ‘F’ analysis, based on  kin term  products was culturally salient. Yet, Read 
objects to Kronenfeld’s argument (1980: 166) that only the ‘L’ analysis was adequate to pro-
vide “valid cross-system comparisons” because, contrary to the specificity of the ‘F’ analysis, 
for such comparisons, 
… one needs to have the parts of the various systems being compared all expressed in a sin-
gle set of units,  19
which is exactly what Kronenfeld says the ‘L’ analysis is able to provide. Read (2018a: 71-3) 
sums up Kronenfeld’s position as follows. Read admits that Kronenfeld is right saying that 
some of the properties of the Fanti kinship terminology are not universal, hence they could 
not be used universally were the aim of the analysis limited to using only Fanti’s non-univer-
sal  kin term  products. However, what Kronenfeld failed to recognize, Read pointed out 
(2018a: 71-2), is – may the reader forbid me this long, but necessary quote –  
… that the principles leading to the generation of a kinship terminology from primary kin 
terms – the latter being the kin terms specifying family relations (Read et al. 2014) – leads 
universally to computational systems enabling culture bearers to determine kin relations 
(Read 2007, Leaf and Read 2012, Read et al. 2014), and these computational systems can be 
the basis for comparison [here a note arguing that structural forms are ‘analytically compara-
ble even when each is generated from different units and structural equations’]. It is the 
structure generated from the units of a kinship terminology, not the units themselves, through 
which intersystem structural comparison should be made.  
Let us next define the mutual relationships between the kinship relationships stemming from 
kin term  products and the genealogical order.  
6.0 Genealogical space and predictions 
Read et al. (2014) model the genealogical space, defined as the totality of possible “path-
ways” that lead, by recursive computing (or genealogical tracing) from a given individual to 
any other individual through child-to-parent or parent-to-child sequences, or through concate-
nations (or strings) of such sequences ultimately linked to a common ancestor. Read et al. 
 A comparable argument was used by Scheffler & Lounsbury (1971: 149): “Aside from their inadequacies …, 19
such analyses [in terms of  kin term  products] fail to carry the analytic process far enough to make the results of 
several such an alysis readily comparable with one another … [and the] analysis has ethnological, or compara-
tive, or theoretical relevance only insofar as it is capable of revealing precisely how and where (a) particular sys-
tem is similar to and different from yet other kinship systems.”
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(2014: 70) stress that the genealogical space comprises a vast number of likely pathways, due 
to the “combinatory explosion” prompted by the existence of maternal and paternal choices at 
each step of the recursion. Let’s take an example. In English, granddaughter of great-uncle is 
a cousin; this statement is a kin term product. In actual occurrence, Simone is instantiating 
this relationship. In ordinary circumstances, this may suffice, but if I have to be more precise 
and express the relationship that ties me to her at a genealogical level, I will be bound to make 
a genealogical tracing, starting from me, to ascend along my mother’s direct line, thus to my 
mother, then to the mother of my mother, then to the father and the mother of the mother of 
my mother who are our common ancestors and then descending to their son (who is the broth-
er of the mother of my mother), then to the son of their son and then to the daughter of the son 
of their son, who is Simone. In English, this genealogical tie is typically labeled: ‘Simone is 
my mother’s mother’s father’s son’s son’s daughter’ (mmfssd), or mother’s mother’s mother’s 
son’s son’s daughter’ (mmmssd), or more commonly, avoiding the common ancestors: my 
mother’ mother’s brother’s son’s daughter (mmbsd). In order to better visualize this linkage, I 
can draw a graph representing both instantiated lines rejoining at the level of common ances-
tors. This tracing illustrates the cognitive difficulties that anyone meets while computing dis-
tant collateral genealogical connections.  
Read (2018a: 83) maintains that computing based on  kin term  products allows pre-
dicting all the kin categories (the relationships of genealogical connection) “subsumed” by 
kinship terms (kinship relations) generated in the process.  As an English example, Read 20
(2018a: 92) takes the  kin term  product of parent by grandparent equals great-grandparent 
symbolized as Pt o GPt = GGPt. Read shows that the predicted kin categories for the kin term 
great-grandparent will be equal to the product of the genealogical instantiations of each of the 
kin terms making up the  kin term  product. The  kin term  instantiations are given by Read 
using lower case letters, ‘m’ for (genealogical) mother, ‘f’ for (genealogical) father.  The in21 -
stantiations for the primary term parent (Pt) are {m; f}, the ones for grand-parent (GPt) 
(Read 2018a: 92) are equal to the product of {m; f} x {m; f} since GPt = Pt o Pt, whose result 
is {mm; fm; mf; ff}, hence the genealogical category subsumed by the kinship term grand-
parent (GPt).  As far as the great-grandparent term is concerned, the product of instantia22 -
tions will be {m; f} x {mm; fm; mf; ff} thus {mmm; fmm; mfm; ffm; mmf; fmf; mff; fff}. 
Taking this process further on, we will be able to compute in the same manner the instantia-
tions of the  kin term  product, parent o (of) great-grandparent = great-great-grandparent (Pt 
 Bennardo & Read (2005: 24, note 19), note that Kronenfeld 1980, “observes – in contradiction of the exten20 -
sionist assumption of rewrite rule analysis – that one can determine the genealogical referents of terms from the 
kin term  calculations via the referents of the primary kin terms.”
 The symbols used here for kin terms are capital letters in italics: GPt (grandparent), Pt (parent), M (mother), 21
F (father), C (child) D (daughter), S (son), Z (sister), B (brother), GC (grand-child), A (aunt), U (uncle). Each of 
these symbols can be combined with anyone else. G will indicate a generation above or under the relationship 
that follows, + or – indicate the fact that a sibling will be older or younger than ego. Genealogical ties are sym-
bolized using lower case letters. 
 Read (2018a: 91, note 23), observes that  kin term  products and their genealogical instantiation (genealogical 22
kin-type products) are written in the opposite direction. Thus, the  kin term  product brother o father = uncle (B 
of F = U) having the genealogical instantiations (the product of genealogical kin categories subsumed by B and 
F) given as {b} x {f} should be read using the possessive case, thus father’s brother {fb}. I, in turn, observe that, 
it is correct as far as English goes, but that in French both the  kin term  product and the genealogical instantia-
tion are expressed in the same direction, using the preposition ‘de’, or ‘du’, so that the  kin term  product frère de 
(o) père = oncle (B o F = U) is instantiated as ‘frère du père’.
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o GGPt = GGGPt), written as {m; f} x {mmm; fmm; mfm; ffm; mmf; fmf; mff; fff} whose 
result is {mmmm; fmmm; mfmm; ffmm etc.}. Read (2018a: 92) concludes that these succes-
sive sets of kin types represent the exhaustive series of genealogical referents for the kin 
terms grandparent, great-grandparent, great-great-grandparent. All the possible genealogical 
referents for kin terms can be calculated in this manner, for all the of  kin term  products from 
a descriptive terminology like the English (or American) and French terminologies.   23
Read (2018a: 92-4) tackles the way that genealogical instantiation is operated from 
kin term  products within classificatory terminologies, taking as an example the  kin term 
product F o(of) F = GPt (tamai o tamai = kui) from the Tongan kinship terminology. Kui can 
be translated as the non-sexually marked general term grandparent. Read (2018a: 93) first 
observes that the predicted genealogical referent for kui generated from tamai o tamai is {f} x 
{f} = {ff} which, he says,  
… obviously is not the full set of genealogical relations for the kin term kui. We also need to 
consider other products of primary ascending terms equal to kui. 
Thus, fa’e o fa’e = kui (‘mother’ o ‘mother’ = ‘grandparent’), fa’e o tamai = kui (‘mother’ o	
‘father’ = ‘grandparent’), tamai o fa’e (‘father’ o ‘mother’ = ‘grandparent’) which is to say 
that, according to kin-type calculus, kui has also for genealogical referents: mm, fm, mf (Read 
2018a: 93). Read only mentions, at this point in his article, what are the focal referents for the 
primary kin terms tamai and fa’e. We know that tamai o	tamai does not simply determine {f} 
x {f} = {ff}, but also – and it is not exhaustive – {f; fb} x {f; fb} = {ff; fbf; ffb; fbfb} and so 
much for the other mentioned products. We should add that the genealogical referents of kui 
are even more extended through the genealogical space as Read (2018a: 93) indicates that  
… kui is used in all ascending generations from the second generation upwards,  
like in tamai o kui = kui, thus F o GPt = GPt (see also Bennardo & Read 2007). 
Read (2018a: 93), then formulates a rule (or property) general in character, regarding 
the relation between a kin term, the  kin term  product leading to this term, and the corre-
sponding genealogical kin-type products: 
In other words, included as genealogical referents of a kin term are the kin-type products 
corresponding to any (italics in the original)  kin term  product that equals (that is, is re-
ducible to, using the structural equations) the kin term in question. 
The question about how kin terms are extended, covering categories of kin types other 
than the primary (or focal) kin type that it designates is addressed by Read at the end of his 
article of 2018a. One of the peculiarities of this question relates to the fact that a number of 
kin term  products, prototypic of classificatory kinship terminologies, reduce the term result-
ing from the product to one of the terms put in the product, like brother of father = father (B o	
F = F) or sister of mother = mother (Z o M = M), daughter of brother (man’s speaking) = 
daughter (D o B = D) etc. Read (2018a: 93) makes it clear that the property that I just men-
tioned, will be used  
… to show how the extension problem is resolved through the generative logic for classifica-
tory terminologies. 
 Thus, for child of (o) uncle = first cousin (cousin germain in French), knowing that uncle covers fb, mb, mzh, 23
fzh (with h = husband), we can write {fb; mb; mzh; fzh} x {s; d} thus {fbs; fbd; mbs; mbd; mzhs; mzhd; fzhs; 
fzhd}. I am not talking here about cousins by marriage.
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I will account for Read’s argument after the part, below, that deals with the generation of clas-
sificatory terminologies. 
7.0 The family space and the sibling conceptualization  
Since it is possible to go from a  kin term  calculus to the determination of its genealogical 
referents, a thing we do more than once during our daily lives when we need to compute the 
precise genealogical connection that binds us to a relative that we name from a particular kin 
term: uncle, great-aunt, second cousin etc., and since it is possible, from computation, to pre-
dict in a realistic and correct manner, the ‘instantiable’ genealogical categories for each and 
every kin term from a kinship terminology, either descriptive or apparently also classificatory 
– the resolution of the extension problem being postponed – it must be assumed that there 
must be a common basis to the two ways of understanding kinship. In the article where Read 
and his colleagues (Read et al. 2014) deal with these fundamental conceptual questions, they 
(2014: 65) assume the necessity of relating 
… the logicality of specific terminology structures to a common conceptual basis for both a 
genealogical and a kin term space. They jointly form a space of kinship relations, and both 
derive from a structure of relations we call a family space [italics in the original]. … The re-
lationship of the family space to the genealogical and kin term spaces [also] makes evident 
two different ways that the sibling relation has been conceptualized. 
By “conceptual basis” common for both genealogical and kin term spaces, Read (2012: 24) 
means the “basic” concepts of kinship (see below), also considered as “axiomatic” (Read 
2015: 53-54). Let me quote the passage where Read et al. (2014: 65) clarify the nature of pri-
mary conceptual relationships upon which the kinship terminologies are built:  
As a cultural construction, the system of kin terms constituting a kinship terminology must 
begin with initial (that is, primitive, in a logical sense) conceptual relations whose definition 
lies outside the kinship terminology, otherwise we have circularity. In our framework these 
primitive conceptual relations are derived from the culturally identified positions that form a 
family space from relations: ‘as ancient as the family’ (Morgan 1871: 10; emphasis in the 
original). 
In his 2012 book (p. 24) Read speaks of:  
… the basic concepts of kinship that have to do with the positions making up the cultural 
concept of a family as a basic social unit, not the form that a culturally constructed system of 
kinship relations takes on. 
The primitive relations are those that are recognized or identified within the familial structure 
between the individuals making it up, which are modelized under the form of a family space, 
conceived between one particular individual, those who engendered him, his parents, who are 
spouses of one another, those that his own parents engendered besides himself, his siblings, or 
sisters and brothers, those whom, in turn, he engendered with his own spouse, his children if 
plural, and of course his spouse, his husband or wife. These relationships, Read et al. (2014: 
66-9) remark, include both cultural and biological dimensions. Morgan (1871: 36, 145, 448 
etc.) called them “primary relations.”  
This is also how Read (2015: 55-6 and Figure 3) conceives them in his “family space” 
model. Furthermore, in his article of 2018a (p. 63) Read answers positively to the question as 
to whether: 
The kin terms making up a kinship terminology are derived directly from primary relations, 
such as the relations linking family members. 
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Morgan (1871: 470) stated, as we mentioned earlier (chapter 1), that the primary relation-
ships, making up the familial circle, were historically, the first to have been assigned specific 
terms, and these have to be logically considered as the primary terms. For his part, Read 
(2018a: 77) assumes that the primary terms structuring kinship systems through their mutual 
products, 
… are terms for the family relations,  
and he adds (2014: 65) that,  
… from an evolutionary viewpoint, these primitive conceptual relations had their origin in 
the evolving mental/cognitive capacities of the precursors of modern Homo sapiens (Read, 
Lane and Van der Leeuw 2009; Read 2010b, Read 2012). 
The family space, defined by Read et al. (2014: 65-66, Figure 1) as a body of four intercon-
nected (primary) “positions” is materialized by means of a ‘”minimal” square-shaped sketch, 
with its four angles symbolizing those positions, also identified using little squares (not repre-
sented in our own graphic below). The superior squares concretize the parent’s generation’s 
positions, the inferior ones the children’s generation’s positions. The mutual and reciprocal 
relationships between the four positions are those between parent and child, child and parent, 
spouse and spouse, child and child (sibling and sibling). These relationships are materialized 
by vertical horizontal or diagonal lines. In fact, each of the squares (or angles) represents two 
positional possibilities: parent and (or) spouse, child and (or) sibling. The different positions, 
one may say, the different ‘statuses’ are actualized (or set up) – here I significantly simplify, 
without, I do hope, betraying the authors thought – or more exactly legitimized by the marital 
institution. This institution is materialized in the sketch by the spouse reciprocal relationship 
(dotted line). 
In a more recent article, Read (2015: Figure 2), a new sketch is added to the first one 
and titled “family structure,” which defines these positions as those of parent (father, and 
mother), spouse (husband and wife) and child (son and daughter), and through vertical, hori-









Figure 2: Family structure. Adapted from Read 2015 (Figure 2) (diagonals, also 
represent parent-child-relations and reciprocally, child-parent relations).
structure. The diagram’s label stipulates that the “structure is that of a nuclear family,”  24
though this appears to be a misstatement since, in the preceding paragraph Read (2015: 55) 
indicates that this structure 
… neither defines, nor determines the empirical form of actual families. Rather, it illustrates 
the structural relationships among the axiomatic kinship relations that are integral to the con-
cept of family. 
Here is an adaptation from this diagram:  
Thus, the positions must be considered as “culturally identified,” this is to say that an individ-
ual does not necessarily derive his status within a family from a biological tie with the other 
members of the family structure. What Read et al.’s (2014) conception implies is that the fam-
ily structure’s (or space) positions are, by definition, put through a filter of cultural criteria, 
coming down to knowing who is to be considered as father, mother, child etc. in a given soci-
ety, and not to consider parents and children as necessarily determined through biological fac-
tors. 
Read (2015: 55 and 56; Figure 2) points out that this model, including these positions 
and their mutual relationships, is to be viewed from the perspective of an outside observer. 
Conversely, the adoption of a self-centered point of view transforms the “family structure” 
into a “family space,” in which the relationships are all considered from the self (myself) posi-
tion. This latter model corresponds, in broad outline, to Morgan’s idea of the familial circle 
(see chapter 1):  
From the self position, we have an ascending direction determined by the parent position in 
relationship to the self position and a descending direction determined by the child position 
in relationship to the self position. (Read et al. 2014: 68) 
As indicated, Read et al. (2014) and Read (2015) make it clear that this model is not peculiar 
to a particular form of family – the nuclear family for example. The authors thus posit that 
each position within the model may be instantiated, according to cultural criteria, by one par-
ticular individual or several (Read et al. 2014: 67 and Figure 1). A father can have several 
wives, or a mother several husbands. The model even encompasses the fact that several 
women can be the spouses of several men, as note 3 (Read et al. 2014: 67) suggests by men-
tioning ethnographic references to group-marriage.  
I will now go back to a crucial question, only briefly outlined earlier: What about the 
sibling position with regard to self ? According to Read et al. (2014: 69), a culture is given 
two structural options as to the sibling position’s orientation. In order to avoid paraphrasing, 
and misrepresenting this important point, I will quote from the authors:  
One, [the first structural possibility], is that the sibling positions are directly linked to the 
parent positions and indirectly to the self position through the parent positions [Figure 3A] 
and the other is that they are directly linked to the self position and indirectly linked to the 
parent positions [Figure 3B]. The two possibilities arise from two interpretations that can be 
made of the fact that one’s parent’s child can either be oneself or one’s sibling. The first pos-
sibility corresponds to imagining child of parent as being distinct from oneself, hence one’s 
parent’s child occupies a sibling position as indicated in Figure 2A. The second possibility 
corresponds to imagining that the child of parent is oneself, hence a sibling position is not 
 Read (2019, personal communication) clarifies that the wording “the ‘structure’ is that of a ‘nuclear family’” 24
should be: “the ‘structure,’ when fully instantiated, will have the structural form of a nuclear family.” See Read’s 
comment on Matthey’s Observation n° 3 below.
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linked directly to a parent position but to the self position as indicated in Figure 2B [Figure 
3A and B here adapted from Read et al. 2014]. 
In other words, insofar as sibling is conceived as child of parent (a child other than myself), 
i.e., generated by the  kin term  product: 
 child o parent = sibling. 
It cannot be considered as a primary term (or relation), because it is itself the product of pri-
mary terms. Conversely, as long as my sibling is conceived as having the same parent(s) as I, 
thus expressed using the  kin term  product:  
parent o sibling = parent, 
the sibling term appears as primary. At first glance, this  kin term  product may appear as triv-
ial or insignificant, but, in fact, the whole demonstration that follows about the generation of a 
classificatory kinship terminology relies on it. Here is a more recent wording by Read (2018a: 
99) pertaining to this question: 
Structurally, there are two ways that a sibling may be defined: (A) speaker’s sibling is the 
child of speaker’s parent other than speaker and (B) individuals A and B are siblings when 
the parents of A are also the parents of B (see Figure 4 [here Figure 3]). Empirical justifica-
tion for these two ways to conceptualise siblings comes from ethnographic observations re-
garding the importance of the sibling relation when sibling is conceptualised through shared 
parents ….  
In order to illustrate the second way to conceptualize a sibling – hence to justify it empirically 
– Read mentions how the Kaluli from New-Guinea – an ethnographic example taken from 
Edward Schieffelin (1976: 54-55) that the author has often taken up in his articles and essays 
on kinship – compute their sibling relationships. Here is the calculation done by the Kaluli 
speaker: 
‘I call him brother because my father calls his father [the father of this brother] brother’…. 
Schieffelin (1976: 54-55), still quoted by Read (2018a: 99, among other quotes) extrapolates 
that the 
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Figure 3: Sibling positions with self position as reference (adapted from Read et al. 2014 and 
Read 2018a).
mother father mother
brother sister brother sisterselfself
A Bfather
… sibling relationship takes precedence over descent [parent-child links] whenever the prin-
ciples are in conflict (italics in the original).  25
Read also quotes Rusiate Nayacakalou (1955: 48), an indigenous Fijian ethnographer, com-
menting upon an analogous Fijian computation:  
… if A is a classificatory father to B, and C is also a classificatory father to B, then A and C 
are classificatory brothers, even if no genealogical tie can be traced between them. 
Read (2018a: 99) emphasizes that Nayacakalou (1955: 46) identifies the sibling conceptual-
ization in Fiji through a principle of common parentage. I will return to this point in one of 
my observations below.  
8.0 Generating descriptive and classificatory kinship terminologies 
We have now reached the most important articulation, which is to explain the difference be-
tween the descriptive and the classificatory terminologies, two designations that, as I have 
already said, Read has kept from Morgan. Read postulates that this difference relates primari-
ly to the fact that the sibling term is or isn’t a primary term within the internal logic of a given 
kinship terminology. The first alternative is constituent of a classificatory terminology, the 
second one of a descriptive terminology. 
Read has set the objective of proposing a theory relating to how, within the two types 
of systems, specific terminological structures may be formally generated. Several steps appear 
necessary in order to reach this goal. I do not intend to repeat everything that the author (or 
the authors) wrote during the course of his (their) demonstration, and I urge my readers to 
read the different articles that I have mentioned throughout the present chapter -- a number of 
which, as Read himself recognizes, are conceptually difficult. Here, I would rather emphasize, 
throughout the following demonstration, what appears crucial with regard to an explanation 
for the peculiar structural features of a classificatory terminology, which, as Read et al. (2014: 
83) reiterate, can be summarized by saying that a classificatory terminology  
… [does] not distinguish between, for example, genealogical parents, and genealogical 
same-sex siblings of genealogical parents.  
With these features constituting the “core property” (i.e., the “classificatory principle,” Read 
2007: 20) of classificatory kinship terminologies. Read then (2007: 20) explains that all the 
theories, up to the time of his writing, have basically failed 
… to recognize that a structural property such as the classificatory principle arises from the 
logic for the generation of kinship terminologies. 
and consequently (Read 2007: 21), one has to  
… outline the logic leading to the equations “Brother” of “Father” = “Father” and “Sister” of 
“Mother” = “Mother.”  
 Schieffelin (1976: 53) observes that the Kaluli, not being great genealogists, may short-circuit these computa25 -
tions by relative products, which, most of the time, bring forward a sibling relationship as a link explaining the 
application of a kin term to a given individual (1976: 54). During this operation, he stresses once again (1976: 
55) that “ties of sibling relationships are in contradiction to those traced by descent and that [the next phrase 
quoted by Read 2018a: 99] the sibling relationship takes precedence over descent ….” Indeed, in a strict ge-
nealogical perspective, the individual that someone calls brother, using the computation described by Schieffe-
lin, and whose father is the paternal uncle of the speaker, is not his genealogical brother but his genealogical 
cousin.
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Among all the steps deemed necessary by Read throughout the process of generating a kin-
ship terminology, whatever its type may be, there are three upon which we must focus our at-
tention: the first one consisting in generating what the author calls an ascending structure (the 
terminology and the structural equations applying to the generations higher than ego’s), the 
second one consisting in generating a descending structure, the third one consisting in using 
one of the universal properties pertaining to kinship systems, i.e., the reciprocity of kin terms.  
Generating the ascending structure, is achieved by formulating all the products of 
primary, ascending kin terms (Read 2007: 21, Read et al. 2014: 79, Read 2018a: 90, 100) per-
taining to a given system, starting from ego’s generation up through the direct ascending line. 
All terminological systems include as primary terms those describing the relationships within 
the family space, thus father, mother, or parent when the kin terms are not sexually marked, 
husband and wife or spouse, daughter and son, or child, sister and brother or sibling. Depend-
ing on whether sibling is conceived as resulting from the product of child and parent (child o	
parent = sibling), or as directly linked to self (see Figure 2 B; parent o sibling = parent), it 
will function as a primary term or not. Let’s recall that, according to Read, a primary term 
does not result from any  kin term  product and that it is from primary terms (or generating 
terms) and through their mutual products that the terminology is built up. Thus, considering 
the American terminology, and confining ourselves to the masculine side, we will have a ter-
minological ascending generating set made up from male self or myself position (written as E 
by Read) consisting of father (F) generating grandfather, through the product father o father 
= grandfather (F o F = GF), then generating great-grandfather by the  kin term  product fa-
ther o father o father = great-grandfather (F o F o F = GGF), etc. The descending structure, 
also generated from self, comprises son (S), and the  kin term  products are son o son = 
grandson (S o S = GS) then son o son o son = great-grandson (S o S o S = GGS), etc.  
For a classificatory system, the generating set for the ascending structure – still confin-
ing ourselves to the masculine side, as in the 2018a article – is male self (myself), father, elder 
brother (written as B+).  Three equations are “introduced.” The first one is B+ o B+ = B+, 26
which Read says identifies the older brother in the ascending structure as a sibling term. The 
second structural equation is written as F o	B+ = F, a  kin term  product that Read asserts 
agrees with the conception of a sibling being someone sharing his parents with self. This last 
equation is crucial as we will see momentarily. The third equation in the ascending structure 
may be F o F o F = F o F, meaning that, within a classificatory terminology and as far as this 
usage is ethnographically asserted, the second generation’s kin terms will be used to designate 
the third generation’s position as well.  Read (2018a: 94) points out that such an equation is 27
“axiomatic,” which means that no satisfactory explanation has been yet given for its exis-
tence, and that one must take it for what it is, because it expresses the idea held by the mem-
 Read et al. (2014: 83-84, note 8) give the reasons why it is essential to take B+ (brother older than self) for the 26
ascending structure, and, through reciprocity B- for the descending isomorphic structure. I do not discuss these 
reasons here.
 While commenting on the first draft of this chapter (paper), Dwight Read wrote, and I quote: “Different ter27 -
minologies have used different ways to limit taking products in an ascending or a descending direction. F o F o 
F = F o F is one way (with variation on the generation level where a reflexive equation like this limits the as-
cending direction), another is that F o F o F o F o F = 0 (there is no kin term after the 4th ascending generation – 
the Punjabi have an equation like this) or F o F o F = S o S o S (the ascending generation forms a circle with the 
descending generation , so F o F o F o F = S o	S, and so on.” 
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bers of a group with respect to these relations. This being said, the  kin term  product B+ o F 
and the possible kin term resulting from it is missing. Let us hold off; it will be generated lat-
er.  
Now we come to the descending structure. It is, by definition isomorphic (Read 
2018a: 94) in relation to the ascending structure, and generated by means of the masculine set 
of descending primary terms: (my)self, son (in relation to father), and brother younger than 
self, (in relation to brother older than self), respectively written as E, S, B-. Read defines the 
conditions that make F and S, and B+ and B-, reciprocal terms. He then introduces the struc-
tural equations isomorphic  to the ones from the ascending structure, S o S = SS, and S o S o	28
S = S o S, isomorphic to F o F o F = F o F, meaning that there is no specific term to desig-
nate the third descending generation’s positions, except, as long as it is conceptualized in this 
manner, by the term(s) pertaining to the second descending generation. He also introduces S o 
B- = S, isomorphic to F o B+ = F. The equation S o B- = S is intrinsically classificatory and 
may be verbalized as: “I call son anyone my younger brother(s) call(s) son.”  
At this point, Read calls upon another “universal” property inherent to kinship sys-
tems: reciprocity. This means that the reciprocal equation of a structural equation expressing a 
kin term  product and pertaining to a given system is also a structural equation belonging to 
this system. Algebraically written, we have that X o Y = Z and its reciprocal Yr o Xr = Zr (with 
the exponent r indicating reciprocity) are both equations for the system if either is an equation 
for the system. Using the American system – the same applies to my own French system – I 
call uncle the person that my father calls brother (B o F = uncle), and I call nephew the one 
my brother calls son, (S o B = nephew), or even, I call son the one my son calls (younger) 
brother (B- o	S = S) and reciprocally I call father the one my older brother calls father (F o 
B+ = F). For the classificatory terminologies, the equation F o B+ = F has the reciprocal 
equation B+r o Fr = Fr, which says that B- o S = S, hence B- o S = S is included as an equation 
in the descending structure.  
The direct outcome of the reciprocal property, with respect to the structural equation S 
o B- = S, is to have the reciprocal equation B-r o Sr = Sr; that is, B+ o F = F. Read also 
demonstrates that B- o F = F and finally that B o F = F (“I call father anyone my father calls 
brother”), which is one of the (principled) equations upon which all classificatory systems are 
based. This demonstration also applies to a feminine generating set, from which one obtains: 
Z o M = M (“I call mother anyone my mother calls sister”). Read concludes that the fact that a 
sibling term is a generating term (a primary term) within a given system appears as the very 
condition for the existence of a classificatory terminology. Allow me to make a citation, par-
ticularly striking in its radicality: 
Surprisingly, the classificatory equation [my emphasis] arises for purely structural reasons 
inherent to the generation of a kinship terminology structure …. We have thus turned Mor-
gan on his head. What Morgan took as a terminology property that required a hypothesized 
behavior such as group marriage for its explanation is, instead, the simple consequence of 
conceptualizing a sibling relationship as a fundamental kin relationship from which other kin 
relations are derived. Nothing could be simpler: sibling conceptualized as an irreducible con-
struct leads logically to the classificatory equation [my emphasis] (expressed using kin term 
products) … (Leaf & Read 2012: 275).  
 Isomorphic means that the application of a set (E) to a set (F) that makes a law of (E) (ex: +) correspond to a 28
law of (F) (ex: x).
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9.0 The problem of the extensions within classificatory systems 
We will deal now with the last point of great anthropological importance, which is to explain 
how a number of kinship terms within classificatory terminologies come to have several ge-
nealogical instantiations, both with regard to the direct and the collateral lines. For Read 
(2018a: 103-104), it is a question of establishing the structural foundation for the extension of 
a number of terms to several genealogical categories (kin-type products), empirically ob-
served, like the extension of the term father – taken as the most mentioned example – to the 
genealogical father’s brother category, written as {fb}, as well as to several collateral cate-
gories of the same generation, like father’s father’s father’s son’s son {fffss (ffbs)}, or father’s 
father’s father’s father’s son’s son’s son {ffffsss (fffbss)}. 
Read (2018a: 103) observes that the first extension to {fb} is established by genealog-
ically instantiating each of the terms of the  kin term  product (or structural equation) B+ o F 
= F = B- o F by means of the product of the categories {b+} x {f} = {b-} x {f}, which equals 
{fb+, fb-} and thus the category {fb}. By contrast, the other extensions are formally estab-
lished, starting from, empirically asserted genealogical extensions of the term father to the 
father’s father’s father’s son’s son or father’s father’s brother’s son genealogical categories 
{fffss (ffbs)} towards the corresponding structural equation – thus for fffss: S o S o F o F o F 
= F. Read then shows that the latter is verified, by reducing it to the irreducible kin term, fa-
ther.  
Read reduces the equation to  
S	o (S o F) o	F o F = F thus to 
S o B o F	o F = F (by the equation S o	F = B, son other than myself).  
This product can be further reduced to 
S o (B o F) o F = F thus to 
S o F o	F = F (by the already verified structural classificatory equation B o F = F),  
This product is then reduced to  
B o F = F (by the equation S o F = B), 
which is the very equation defining classificatory terminology systems.  
Read goes on (2018a: 104) to comment: 
… hence the genealogical relation given by the kin-type product fffss corresponds to the  kin 
term  product S o S o F o F o F = F, and so the genealogical relation fffss is included under 
the kin term F. 
Read (2018a: 104) then stipulates that all the genealogical extensions of the terms belonging 
to classificatory kinship terminologies are likely to be predicted in the same manner: 
… by reducing the corresponding  kin term  product with the structural equation for generat-
ing the kinship terminology to a kin term K that is irreducible, then assigning the genealogi-
cal string to K.  
Read (2018a: 104) concludes: 
We find that the predicted assignments match(es) the observed assignments for all kin terms, 
consequently we have an explanatory argument (see Read 2008) for the categories of ge-
nealogical relations associated with the kin terms in a classificatory terminology. 
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The fact that it is possible to predict in this manner the genealogical content of  kin term 
products appears to confirm two things (Read 2007: 10).  First, that the definition of kin term 29
via genealogical criteria does not constitute 
… [the] irreducible information about kin terms …, 
then, that if terminologies can be generated from  kin term  products, also taking into account 
a few structural equations, as I just mentioned,  
… then we have constructed a formal way [my emphasis] to generate both the kin terms for 
the kinship terminology and their genealogical content. This result shifts the basis for com-
parison of terminologies to the primary kin terms and the structural equations from which the 
terminologies can be generated ….  
10.0 Conclusion	
In this chapter I aimed at showing how Dwight Read managed, through a long, methodical 
and thorough theoretical endeavor to build up the idea of the necessity of a paradigm change 
in kinship anthropology. This conception has its origins in a new approach on how people 
within different human societies work out their mutual kinship relationships by computing 
kin term s (using an algebraic operation that Read defined as a  kin term  product), even with-
out having the faintest idea of the actual genealogical ties that may be referred to by the kin 
terms involved during this operation. 
This fact, once firmly established on the basis of consistent ethnographic data, led him 
to reconsider how kin terms and kinship terminologies should be scientifically interpreted. 
Rather than linguistic labels for genealogical kin-types, kin terms are instead viewed as cul-
tural constructs linked to each other through kin term products, starting from primary terms 
(those referring to the kinship relationships that are directly related to ego in the family 
sphere, like the mother, father, child relations etc.) and then building outward to form a sys-
tem of kin terms (a kinship terminology). Read went on to demonstrate how the structure of 
kinship terminologies (the systemic way in which the terms are generated for any given ter-
minology) is precisely based on the internal (algebraic) logic of  kin term  products, a logic 
differing from that of genealogical tracing, based on children to parents up(down)ward se-
quences which he defines as recursive. Read thus posits a kinship terminology as a symbolic 
computational system based on  kin term  products. 
Although displaying different logics, both modes of computing relationships (the sys-
tem of genealogical connections, and the kinship terminology) have common deep roots in a 
structure of relations that has procreation and marriage at its basis. Read points out how the 
two modes of working out relationships can be understood in relation to one another, notably 
showing how the extension of a number of kin terms from a given kinship terminology to ge-
nealogical categories more distant than the ones they primarily refer to may be determined 
through the inner computation logic of the given kinship terminology itself. 
Perhaps the most salient part of the contribution that Dwight Read has made to kinship 
theory is to show how the paradigm change that he calls for also radically modifies the ideas 
that can be formulated about how kinship systems, and notably classificatory systems have 
been (or are) established. Observing that none of the theories that were put forward so far, ei-
 It is also possible to find the appropriate kin term for a kin relation from information that is genealogical by 29
nature. The computation, though, may be painstaking when the genealogical tie happens to be on a collateral 
line, e.g., a mother’s mother’s father’s brother’s son’s daughter (mmfbsd) is a third cousin once removed.
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ther the rewrite rules analysis or other accounts appealing to factors external to the terminolo-
gies themselves, and supposed to motivate its structure, have provided consistent explicative 
answers to the existence of the two different forms of kinship terminology structure, the clas-
sificatory and the descriptive – a distinction that he has rescued from Morgan and founded on 
whether or not the lineal genealogical relations are terminologically merged with the collater-
al – Read went on to argue in detail how different modes of conceptualizing a sibling may 
have consequences for generating kinship terminology structures. Sibling, conceptualized in 
terms of shared parentage, and embodied by the  kin term  product F o B = F, will lead, by 
bringing into play two properties universal to kinship terminologies, namely isomorphism be-
tween ascending and descending kin term structures and reciprocity between structural equa-
tions, to generating a classificatory terminology. Sibling conceptualized as parent’s offspring 
other than self is embodied by the  kin term  product S o F = B, meaning that sibling is a 
“concept constructed from the kin terms parent and child” (Read 2014: 85) has no generative 
value in the descriptive terminology where it is found.   
On the historical side, Read has posited a sequence where the concept of genealogical 
connections and genealogical tracing appeared on the stage long before kinship terminologies 
arose. However, due to the cognitive difficulties entailed by the long chains of genealogical 
strings, or by the number of possible genealogical “pathways” by which distant genealogical 
connections can be established, notably collateral relations, a new system easier to handle, of 
symbolic and mathematical nature, was introduced into Homo sapiens social repertoire at 
about the same time when other highly symbolic achievements emerged in the societies of the 
Upper Paleolithic.  
I will now proceed with the observations that Read’s theoretical achievement has 
prompted me to make. 
Observa4ons	about	Dwight	Read’s	theory	made	by	Alain	MaAhey	with	
interlinear	comments	wriAen	by	Dwight	Read	in	italics	
1. Read (2018a: 91-2 and note 23), takes good care to distinguish the phrasing of a 
kin term  product from the one corresponding to genealogical tracing. The former 
appears in the form of the equation X o Y = Z; for example, mother o (of) father = 
grandmother (M o F = GM); the latter, which amounts to a genealogical instanti-
ation from this product, appears, in English, in the form of the possessive case, 
thus father’s mother, which, as Read says (2014: 70) signals a genealogical se-
quence going from parent to parent. This assertion about the possessive form dis-
tinguishing genealogical sequences from kin term products is not generalizable to 
other languages. In French, as well as in numerous other languages, both formu-
las – kin term product and genealogical sequence – are formally equivalent and 
one would say mère de père for both in French. 
Morgan stressed that in a number of kinship terminologies, kinship 
nomenclatures were in the form of a combination of primary terms. I have al-
ready mentioned his examples taken from Gaelic languages, where one finds, 
according to his sources, the terms mac mac my shuyr, literally ‘son of son of sis-
ter,’ in Gaelic Manx, or bràthair m’athair, literally ‘brother of father’ in Scottish 
Gaelic. I also listed a few examples taken from the Arabic kinship terminology. A 
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number of Arabic kin term products, starting with those including primary terms, 
may not end up with another term but with some descriptive formula, thus a 
combination or composition of kin terms, either primary or not. The product of 
ibn o ibn (son o son), if we follow Morgan’s tables (1871: 77-127) displaying the 
Arabic kinship terminology (among other mostly descriptive terminologies), re-
sults in ibn ibni, ‘son of my son,’ the product of ibn o ibn o ibn will equal ibn ibn 
ibni, ‘son of son of my son.’ Still in Arabic, all the relations through cousinhood 
obtained through products of children by aunts or uncles will also results in de-
scriptive formulas: bint o	‘amma (daughter o paternal sister) = bint ‘amma, ibn o	
hāl (son o maternal uncle) = ibn hāl etc. (see also Cuisenier & Miquel 1965). In 
the context of Aboriginal Australia, George Taplin (1879: 156) published evi-
dence, brought up by Gason, of descriptive formulas within the Dieri’s classifica-
tory terminology, side by side with simple kin terms. Thus, andrie kakoonie noa, 
literally meaning, in this order, ‘mother-sister-spouse,’ (cf. English mother’s sis-
ter’s husband), coexists with apirrie wauka that we have already met and refers 
to a secondary or ‘little’ father. The existence of such parallel systems seems to 
give some credit to Morgan’s idea (1877: 484) about the coexistence of a descrip-
tive system – that we can also interpret as a system of genealogical tracing – and 
a classificatory system within one single language.  Such examples could be 30
multiplied. This does not deprive the concept of kin term product from its opera-
tive value, but may limit its scope. Read observes that a kin term product may 
have several outcomes: another kinship term, which is the usual case, no kin 
term, or even more than one (Read 2018a: 75).  To this we must add the possi31 -
bility that one  kin term  product leads back to itself.   32
DR: The comments by AM regarding kin term nomenclature are informative. I 
deliberately do not deal with nomenclature as this is a separate dimension or-
thogonal to the dimension of structure and my focus has been on the structure of 
kinship terminologies. How nomenclature relates to structure and how structure 
is represented through nomenclature would be a useful expansion of my work on 
the structure of terminologies. AM’s comment that the kin term product also in-
 Unfortunately, Morgan (1877: 484) is not very precise when he claims that “All the tribes possessing the Tu30 -
ranian system (a classificatory system, my emphasis) describe their kindred by the same formula, when asked in 
what manner one person was related to another. A descriptive system precisely like the Aryan always existed 
both with the Turanian and the Malayan, not as a system of consanguinity, for they had a permanent system, but 
as means of tracing relationships.” This system, brought to light by Morgan, bears similarities with what Read 
calls genealogical tracing. But, through this phasing, one can also assume that Morgan alludes, without clearly 
conceptualizing it, to a kin term product system. 
 Read (2018a: 75) gives the American-English example of the product of mother by first cousin once removed, 31
which may be either great-aunt or first cousin because the term first cousin once removed can address the child 
of a first cousin or the child of great-aunt. 
 These ‘descriptive’ combinations of primary terms could indicate a terminological impoverishment following 32
a structural terminological change. Within Gaelic systems, it could be that the second generation’s descriptive 
combinations correspond to the disappearance of the inherited PIE grandparents and grandchildren terms. This 
seems to be also the case for the first ascending and descending terms. The descriptive formulas seem to have 
taken precedence over the inherited terms designating uncles and aunts. What is happening with the cousin terms 
is less clear since no term for these relations has been yet formally reconstructed at the PIE level.
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cludes the case where the kin term product of K and L leads back to L is implicit 
in my phrase: “the  kin term  product of the kin terms K and L leads to the kin 
term M by the equation, K o L = M.”(2018a: 75) since L and M could be the 
same kin term and, if so, K o L = L. Nonetheless, it is better to be explicit in the 
manner that AM suggests. 
2. Among the examples of vernacular  kin term  products pointed out by Read in 
different articles, some appear where the computing process looks inverted and 
so cannot be strictly formalized as kin term products in precisely the sense that 
Read first defined them. Let’s take the two examples described previously in this 
chapter. The first one is when two Lama Lama male speakers who had never met 
before, proceed to establish their mutual kinship relations by reference to a third 
person with whom both are related. The second, well known example taken from 
Radcliffe-Brown (1913: 150-51), is recounts how a Kariera speaker computes the 
correct kinship term to be applied to an individual he does not know but who has 
a well-defined kin relation to a third person to whom he is himself (the first 
speaker) related:  
Let us suppose, as an example, that two men, A and B, meet each other for the first 
time. The man A has a relative C who is his mama (father, my emphasis). At the 
same time C is the kaga (maternal uncle, my emphasis) of B. It immediately fol-
lows that A and B are kumbali (cousins, my emphasis) to each other.  
This triangulation can be graphically represented as follows:  
The very same situation, in my French system, is when I call cousin the man (al-
ter B) who calls oncle, my father (alter C). Here is the graphic triangulation: 
The formula summing up this situation is not the one that Antony Good (1981: 
113, quoted in Read 2018a: 73) used to describe the kin term computing process 













If ego knows what term to use for Alter A, and also knows what term A uses for 
Alter B, he can easily work out what term he himself should use for B.  
But rather, while remaining faithful to the compact side of the phrasing, it would 
be:  
If ego knows what term to use for Alter A and also knows what term B uses for Al-
ter A, he can easily work out the term he himself should use for B. 
Apparently both procedures are used indifferently by the speakers in any 
language – though this remains to be verified in detail. Thus, one can easily con-
ceive, as I just exemplified with my own language, that with regard to the relative 
who calls my father oncle, I call him(her) cousin or cousine or that a relative who 
is called neveu or nièce by my father I call him(her) cousin or cousine as well. 
The difference between the two methods is that the first one, as it stands, cannot 
be formally represented as a product of kin terms. This, however, does not re-
move anything from the operational value of the kin term product. Although 
these two ways in which mutual kinship relationships are established might ap-
pear different, the first one is likely to be reduced to the second one.  
Thus, the Kariera-type computation (first triangulation on page 151) re-
ported by Radcliffe-Brown is likely to amount – in terms of mental operations – 
to working out  kin term  products. The male speaker A is likely to (mentally) 
formulate: “B is kuling (‘nephew’ [‘son’ of ‘sister’]) of C, my mama (‘father’) 
thus he is kumbali (‘cousin’) to me,” and the male speaker B in turn works out: 
“A is mainga (‘son’) of C, my kaga (‘maternal uncle’) thus he is kumbali 
(‘cousin’) to me.”  In the French example, one just replaces oncle by neveu or 33
nièce, its reciprocal term, and obtains neveu (nièce) o (of) père = cousin(e). 
The case involving two Lama Lama male speakers reported in Von 
Sturmer (1981) and quoted by Dousset (2008), where A (Mickey) calls the 
woman C aunty, and B (Mareeba man) calls C granny, can be as well reduced to 
the  kin term  products grandson of aunty and nephew of granny. But, not being 
knowledgeable of the common vernacular kinship terminology they are using, I 
will transpose the interaction between the two men into the Kariera language and 
kinship terminology.  
Suppose, then, that A (Mickey) calls the woman C (his ‘aunty’) toa (‘fa-
ther’s sister’), and that his interlocutor, B, calls C (his ‘granny’) kandari (‘moth-
er’s mother’). A (Mickey) knowing that C is kandari (‘mother’s mother’) to B, 
immediately deduces that B is kandari (‘daughter’s son’) to C (see Radcliffe-
Brown 1913: 154 about the reciprocal use of the terms for grandparents). He will 
now think out the kin term product:  
 The example, often borrowed by Read (2018a: 73 and elsewhere) from Marshall Sahlins (1962: 155), illus33 -
trates the way that the Moala speakers from the Fiji islands work out their kinship relationships. We are still in 
the case where one supposes that Ego (A) never met the third person (Alter C): 
… if A is related to B as child to mother, veitanani, while C is related to B as veitacini, sibling of the same sex, 
then it follows that A is related to C as child to mother although they never before met or knew it.  
Thus, this is a situation of Kariera type, where A knows the term that C uses to address B. What makes this situa-
tion peculiar is that B and C are same-sex siblings. In other words, they address one another as siblings of the 
same sex (veitacini). This configuration can, consequently, be narrowed to the kin term product Z o M = M 
(veitacini o veitanani = veitanani).
 162
… kandari o toa (C) = mainga (DS o FZ = S). Thus, B is mainga (‘son’) to 
Mickey. 
Now B (the other man), knowing that C is toa (father’s sister) to A, immediately 
deduces that A is toa (‘brother’s son’) to C, as toa is reciprocally used between 
father’s sister and brother’s son (FZ – BS). B then works out the following  kin 
term  product: 
… toa o kandari (C) = mama (BS o	MM = F). Thus, Mickey is mama (‘fa-
ther’) to B.  
These three fictitious examples illustrate how the “Kariera-type” interac-
tions between two individuals not knowing each other but both having a definite 
kin relation with a third person may actually be narrowed to the interlocutors 
working out their mutual kin relationships using  kin term  products in the man-
ner that Read indicates.  
DR: It definitely would be useful to have more systematic studies of the way the 
users of kinship terminologies determine kin term relations when the proper rela-
tion is not known to the parties involved, and not just anecdotal, or largely anec-
dotal, accounts.  
3. Now consider the family space as a conceptual foundation of kinship relations. 
The joint article by Read et al. (2014: 65) has a broad conceptual scope and in-
tends (I repeat here my previous quote of this passage):  
… to relate the logicality of specific kinship terminology structures to a common 
conceptual basis for both a genealogical and a kin term space. They jointly form a 
space of kinship relations, and both derive from a structure of relations we call a 
family space (emphasis in the original) … The relationship of the family space to 
the genealogical and kin term spaces also makes evident two different ways that 
the sibling relation has been conceptualized. 
Read et al. (2014) go on to say: 
As a cultural construction, the system of kin terms constituting a kinship terminol-
ogy must begin with initial (that is, primitive, in a logical sense) conceptual rela-
tions whose definition lies outside the kinship terminology, otherwise we have cir-
cularity. In our framework these primitive conceptual relations are derived from the 
culturally identified positions that form a family space from relations “as ancient 
as the family” (Morgan 1871: 10, emphasis in the original).  
Read tells us that the logic of terminological systems -- I quote all the articula-
tions – “derive from” (Read 2015: 53, Read 2018a: 63), “begin with” (Read et al. 
2014: 65), or “has to do” with (Read 2012: 24) primary or “primitive” conceptual 
relations, which in turn “derive” or come from the culturally identified positions 
of the family space. In other words, the kinship terminologies, as well as the sep-
arate genealogical scaffolding, both find their very basis in the primary relations 
generated by the advent of the family within archaic Homo sapiens society. These 
primary relations and concepts, and the terms that they engender, have their deep 
roots, Read says (2015: 53): 
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In … the biological facts of reproduction and in culturally defined marriage sys-
tems that define conditions for offspring to be fully recognized as social members 
of a society … 
Read (2015: Figures 2 and 3) acknowledges that his diagram that introduces the 
“concept of self into the family structure,” and is supposed to “incorporate all the 
elements for the concept of a family,” is modeled on the structure of a “nuclear 
family,” while he admits (2015: Figures 2 and 3) that actual families may have 
empirical forms depending on the cultural instantiations of the categories in the 
family structure. 
DR: My wording, “The structure is that of a nuclear family…”, suggests that I 
derived the family structure/family space using the nuclear family as a model. 
That is not the case. Instead, I asked myself: Which of our primary kinship rela-
tions could reasonably, in a deep history sense, have been understood even be-
fore our hominin ancestors had worked out a rudimentary kinship terminology 
system? The obvious candidate is the mother relation – we intuitively know who 
is a mother and what is meant by the mother relation through the facts of preg-
nancy, birth, nursing, mothering behavior, and so on. The father relation likely 
came into play as the ability for an emotional bond between a male and a female 
developed, and the marriage relation was then a cultural way to resolve the in-
herent ambiguity of the father relation. It is only after these primary relations are 
in play that it makes sense to refer to the nuclear family as a social unit. Thus, 
more accurate wording would be: “The Family Space, though it may appear to 
resemble the form of a nuclear family, differs from a nuclear family in the follow-
ing ways …” Even better is the wording I used in Read (2018a: 84) “By a Family 
Space will be meant a mental construct, not the instantiation of a mental con-
struct such as the nuclear family that is part of the phenomenal domain.” In the 
book edited by Warren Shapiro in which the article, Read (2018a), appears, The 
contradiction is due to incorrect wording used by Shapiro, the senior author for 
the Introduction, that I, the junior author, missed in the proof-reading stage of the 
book’s publication. 
The legend of Figure 1 of the joint article of 2014 (Read et al. 2014: 66) 
stipulates that one person or several may be assigned to each of the positions 
within the family space according to cultural criteria. With regard to the positions 
of parent-spouse, for example, this remark allows the assignation of one man to 
the position of father-spouse, and several women to the position of mother-
spouse, thus generating a polygynous family space; or several men may be as-
signed to the father-spouse position and one woman to the mother-spouse posi-
tion, generating a polyandrous family space. Even more, if several men are as-
signed to the father-spouse position and several women to the mother-spouse po-
sition, we will get a group family space (Figure 4). 
This last possibility is briefly addressed later in the same article (2014 et al.: 67, 
note 3) with the mention of ethnographical references to group marriage in 
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Thomas (1906).  Is this to say that Read et al. (2014) rehabilitates, by the back 34
door, a solution that Read (2007: 20) rejected a few years ago, arguing that the 
distinction established by Morgan between the descriptive and the classificatory 
terminologies:  
… was extremely insightful though non-intuitive as indicated by his abortive at-
tempt to account for classificatory terminologies through group marriage.  
DR: Whether group marriage in the form of a cohort of brothers marrying a co-
hort of sisters was ever the regular practice of any group is an empirical ques-
tion. Whether group marriage of this kind could account for classificatory termi-
nologies is a logical one. Morgan’s argument was rejected on the empirical 
grounds that there was no ethnographic evidence showing that group marriage of 
brothers with sisters ever occurred – but that does not establish that group mar-
riage like this never occurred over the time frame for the deep history of kinship 
relations. However, even if brother-sister group marriages did occur, Morgan’s 
argument connecting marriage like this to classificatory terminologies is faulty 
as his argument only provides an argument for why father and father’s brother 
might both be referred to by the same kin term, but this does not establish why 
other males in the +1 generation would also be referred to as ‘father’ and it does 
not establish the symmetry between the ‘father’ term and the ‘mother’ term. Also, 
it does not establish why, in classificatory terminologies, there are two terms for 
same sex sibling, conventionally translated as ‘older same sex sibling’ and 
‘younger same sex sibling.’ Regardless of the empirical facts regarding whether it 
ever occurred, brother-sister group marriage does not account for the classifica-
tory terminologies on logical grounds.  
 As we noted earlier, Thomas (1906) is – with Malinowski (1913) – one of the most ferocious destroyers of the 34





Figure 4: Family space where several individuals are assigned to the positions of 
parent-spouse. The triangles stand for males, the circles for females, the sign equal 
indicates a spouse relation between all the individuals belonging to the first ascend-
ing generation. For purpose of clarity, I do not represent the sibling relation.
Let us go on. Read postulates that the logic pertaining to kinship terminologies, 
as well as the genealogical relations, arise from, or derive from the culturally 
identified positions making up the family space. We are entitled to ask in what 
manner. 
DR: Genealogical relations derive from the relations in the Family Space using 
the logic of recursion. Thus, the mother relation links child to child’s mother, then 
recursively, the mother relation links child’s mother to child’s mother’s mother 
and so on. Similarly, for the other relations in the Family Space. The Family 
Space relations lead to kin terms and the kin term space through the binary prod-
uct logic of kin term products. Thus, the mother relation leads to, through kin 
term products, mother o mother = ‘grandmother’, where ‘grandmother’ is the 
English translation of the name assigned culturally to the kin term product: 
mother o mother. Similarly, mother o ‘grandmother’ = ‘great grandmother’, 
where ‘great grandmother’ is the English translation of the name culturally as-
signed to the kin term product, mother o ‘grandmother’, and so on. Similar com-
putations hold for the other relations in the Family Space.  
We can see this duality for the Family Space as the foundation for both a 
Genealogical Space and a Kin Term Space in languages such as English where 
the same word is used for both a genealogical relation and a kin term relation. 
The English sentence “She is my mother” is ambiguous with regard to whether 
“she” is the woman who begat me and so I am referring to her in a genealogical 
sense, or whether, if I happen to be adopted, I am referring to her as mother in a 
kin term sense. Further, it is the fact that genealogical relations derive from the 
logic of recursion and kin terms relations derive form the logic of binary prod-
ucts that we assign the genealogical relation, m, to the kin term, ‘mother’, the 
genealogical relation f to the kin term ‘father’ and so on. 
According to Read, the particular form that the instantiation of the family 
space takes, seems to be of secondary importance in the building process of kin-
ship terminologies. Thus, the Matis, an Amerindian ethnic group living in the 
Javari River Basin of western Brazil, display a classificatory kinship terminology 
and their marriage practices are multi-faceted: individual, polygynous and poly-
androus (Erikson 2002). This is apparently consistent with the idea that the for-
mal structure of classificatory terminologies does not reflect actual matrimonial 
usages, instantiating the parent-spouse positions from the family space, but has to 
do with factors of cultural order – or are culturally determined or in compliance 
with cultural requirements – that come into play in kinship conceptions, thus in 
primordial relations generated by the family structure, such as the conceptualiza-
tion of the sibling relation (see observation 5). 
4. Read’s theory about the generation of descriptive versus classificatory kinship 
terminologies basically rests on how the sibling relationship is conceptualized in 
a given culture. The difference between the generative logic leading, on the one 
hand, to descriptive terminologies, and on the other hand, to classificatory termi-
nologies depends on whether the sibling term is – or is not – a primary term, and 
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thus a generating term within the terminological system. Earlier, we pointed out a 
number of examples, collected by Read, showing how, within a classificatory 
context, siblingship is conceived according to the principle of common parentage. 
Read formalized the difference between the two conceptions by means of two 
kin term  products: 
S o F = B where B is not a primary term and 
F o B = F where B is a primary term. 
Regarding this crucial part of Dwight Read’s theory, I was intrigued about how 
Read (2018a: 99) relates the second  kin term  product to several examples of 
classificatory nature taken from Schieffelin (1976), Burridge (1959-60) and Nay-
acakalou (1955), supposed to illustrate a conceptualization of sibling in terms of 
“shared parents,” a conceptualization that Nayacakalou, identifies through the 
“principle (my emphasis) … of common parentage” (Nayacakalou 1955: 46, 
quoted in Read 2018a: 99). 
Thus, I came to read the entire excerpt where Nayacakalou (1955: 46) 
speaks of this principle. Here it is: 
The second [unifying] principle (the first one being common descent by fathers, 
my emphasis) is that of common parentage, which binds together the members of a 
sibling group. This group forms the prototype of relationship at each generation 
level within the lineage group. The principle of common parentage, by simple ex-
tension using the classificatory principle, enables all the members of each genera-
tion within the lineage group to be classified together as siblings. 
To make himself even clearer, Nayacakalou (1955: 46) then quoted Radcliffe-
Brown (1950: 24) commenting on the unity of the sibling group: 
… a son may, in a particular system, be taught to regard his father’s sibling group 
as a united body with whom he is related as their ‘son.’ 
Such a configuration certainly applies to the other examples given by Read. Il 
will not discuss them any further for now. See also Read’s comments about Ob-
servation 8, below.  
DR: Radcliffe-Brown’s notion of the Unity of the Sibling group as an explanation 
for genealogical father and father’s brothers (among others) all being referred to 
as ‘father’ lacks one crucial property: By what criterion does one know whether 
the Unity of the Sibling group is operative in a particular society since this prop-
erty is not universal? The answer, as I have shown formally in Read (n.d.), is that 
the Unity of the Sibling group occurs and operates in the manner discussed by 
Radcliffe-Brown when siblings are conceptualized as those persons who share 
the same parents. Consequently, Nayacakalou’s elaboration on common parent-
age is simply spelling out the logical consequences of this sibling criterion – con-
sequences that are worked out formally in the various papers by Read that AM 
has referenced. Classificatory terminologies, Radcliffe-Brown’s Unity of the Sib-
ling group, Nayacakalou’s elaboration on common parentage, and Schieffelin’s 
and Burridge’s observations that I have referenced all have their foundation in a 
single concept: Siblings are those persons who share the same parents. 
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Now shift to the historical level. One may consider that societal entities, 
each independently, have conceptualized siblingship one way or the other in the 
course of their historical development for reasons that remain to be determined, 
this driving ipso facto a particular semantic into their respective kinship termi-
nologies. The initial conceptions about kinship, as well as the terminologies ap-
parently resulting therefrom, may have been transmitted over long periods by 
human groups (or linguistic families), modified only here or there in some struc-
tural or terminological details. Let’s add yet another aspect: What, other than 
chance, are the general conditions that drove the emergence of these two concep-
tions of sibling that are apparently radically opposed ? (I have difficulties believ-
ing that the emergence was due to chance.) A number of ethnographic testimonies 
– many of which I gathered from the literature – show the importance of sibling-
ship (the fact of being sisters and brothers) in the social, familial, sexual, and rit-
ual life, as well as in their material organization for a majority of human groups 
worldwide, whether hunter-gatherers or not. Among the social behaviors that are 
connected with siblingship, there is notably the fact that groups of brothers – the 
same may be true for sisters – , as many have reported is the case among hunter-
gatherer societies, live in the same camp or in the same longhouse, with their re-
spective spouses – often sisters – who they episodically share, or to whom any 
brother may have sexual access, in a more or less systematic manner, and over 
variable periods. Howitt showed how the Dieri kinship terminology is indebted to 
the institution of Pirrauru relation for a number of its semantic and terminologi-
cal peculiarities. We will see later that similar situations are widely distributed. 
These behavioral characteristics are part, it seems, of what Read (2007: 4) desig-
nates as “external processes” of a social nature that, he considers, are foreign to 
the generation of kinship terminologies. It is not inconceivable, however, that the 
concept (i.e., the ideology) of siblingship, expressed in terms of common parent-
age between several individuals, might have been – as it is undeniably a very old 
perception – based on group relations between brothers and their spouses, some-
times also sisters (I don’t speak here about marriage), thus implying a more or 
less close-knit community or collaboration in the material life, the education of 
children, the provisioning of the camp, the sexual and the ritual life, and so on. 
Such a socio-familial context would, without a doubt, favor the fact that the chil-
dren, within the limits of the groups thus defined, would consider themselves to 
be born from the same fathers, and thus would consider themselves to be brothers 
and sisters. This group structuring would then be a solid foundation and motiva-
tion for the conception of siblingship through common parentage, that the 
ethnography brings to light. 
DR: My argument regarding the consequences of the two different ways that sib-
lings may be perceived, either as being the children of one’s parents other than 
oneself, or as sharing the same parents, does not address the conditions under 
which one or the other perception of siblingship should occur, and it is useful that 
AM has considered some of the situations under which the second perception of 
siblingship might occur. However, his argument needs a causal connection be-
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tween behavior on the ground and the fact of classificatory terminology systems 
that the same kin term that refers to genealogical father (f) also applies ge-
nealogically to fb, ffbs, fffbss, and so on. As stated, his argument does not ac-
count for this property of the ‘father’ term since he places no constraint, neither 
on the genealogical relations among the (adult) males who are, according to his 
argument, in the same community nor on the children who are in that community 
as well. Then he states that under the conditions he outlines all of the males of 
the community will be referred to as ‘father’ by all of the children of the commu-
nity. The argument needs a causal mechanism as to why this leads the children to 
collectively refer to all the males collectively as ‘father.’ Absent such a causal 
mechanism the argument becomes circular. In addition, and in a manner that 
needs to be explained, the genealogically disparate group of children and the ge-
nealogically disparate group of adult males that initially need not match the ge-
nealogical categorization for the ‘father’ term, the ‘son’ term or the ‘brother’ 
term in a classificatory terminology then gets sorted into a group of males who 
genealogically match the genealogical categorization of a ‘father’ term in a clas-
sificatory terminology, and a linked group of children, each of whom is the ge-
nealogical child of one of the males in the linked group of males. In addition, not 
only must there be this sorting, but the children, all of whom initially referred to 
all of the adult males as ‘father’ according to AM’s argument, must now shift to 
only calling the males in the linked group of males by the term ‘father.’ That clas-
sificatory terminologies could arise in this manner does not seem plausible. 
The formal development proposed by Dwight Read, which implies one or 
the other sibling conception for the foundation of terminological structures, ap-
pears to be fundamentally innovative. I have no difficulty either to accept that the 
“classificatory equation”, B o F = F (“I call father someone my father calls 
brother”) appears as the result of the structural logic inherent to the process of 
generating a kinship terminology (Leaf & Read 2012: 275), thus the structure 
would reflect cognitive processes implemented through the internal logic of a 
kinship terminology. 
But this is not the scenario that Read, Leaf and colleagues favor, for they 
leave unanswered the question as to why, in some cultures, one calls brother 
someone called son by a third person that his father (the father of the first indi-
vidual) calls brother, even knowing that the two first individuals are not neces-
sarily genealogically related.  
DR: The logic of generating a terminology under the cultural contexts in which 
siblings are conceptualized as those who share the same parents conditions leads 
to the kin term product, ‘brother’ o ‘father’ = ‘father’ and since ‘son’ o ‘father’ = 
‘brother’; it follows that speaker’s fbs is a genealogical relation that speaker 
refers to as ‘brother’. The reverse need not be true. The Fanti terminology is a 
descriptive and not a classificatory terminology (pace Kronenfeld 2009), yet has 
the structural equation ‘brother’ o ‘father’ = ‘father’ (Read n.d.). As discussed in 
Read (2018b), the Fanti, the Shipibo and the Punjabi terminologies are a se-
quence of descriptive terminologies in which each has the equation ‘son’ o ‘fa-
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ther’ o … o ‘father’ (n+1 times) = ‘father’ o … o ‘father ’ (n times). The Fanti 
has this equation for n = 1, thus it has the equation ‘son’ o ‘father’ o ‘father’ = 
‘brother’ o	‘father’ = ‘father. The Shipibo has this equation for n = 2, thus it has 
the equation ‘son’ o ‘father’ o ‘father’ o ‘father’ = ‘brother’ o ‘grandfather’ = 
‘grandfather’. The Punjabi terminology has this equation for n = 3, thus it has 
the equation ‘son’ o ‘father’ o ‘father’ o ‘father’ o ‘father’ = ‘brother’ o ‘great 
grandfather’ = ‘great grandfather’. The reason for having the equation may be to 
simplify the ascending terminology for higher order generations, with n being a 
structural parameter whose value reflects the maximum generational level that 
plays an elaborated functional role in the society’s form of social organization. 
Thus, the Fanti terminology, in comparison to the Punjabi terminology, has a 
relatively simple terminology mainly spanning generations -2 to +2, and this may 
reflect a less elaborated form of social organization in Fanti society in compari-
son to Punjabi society.  
Schieffelin, as I indicated in footnote 25, said that, insofar as the ge-
nealogical ties between the two individuals are difficult to trace out,  it is the 35
relation of sibling, generated during the working out of the  kin term s that pre-
vails. Here we have the embodiment of a cultural fact in the sense that Read and 
colleagues understand it, resulting in a gap between the genealogical given and 
the conceptualization of kin relations by a particular culture, in this instance, un-
der the form of siblingship as this is understood, shared and conveyed by all cul-
ture bearers through their kinship terminology.  
DR: It is precisely this genealogical gap that underscores why a paradigm shift is 
needed, going away from the ontological assumption: procreation → genealogi-
cal relations → (categories of genealogical relations) → (kin terms as labels of 
genealogical categories) to an ontology in which procreation → Family Space → 
[(1) Genealogical Space or (2) Kin Term Space] → Kinship Space. 
So, we are back to Morgan and his astonishment when faced with the ap-
parent absurdity of kinship classification as it is recognized among the Seneca 
even when confronted with the perfectly transparent genealogical ties resulting 
from descent. Read (2012: 24) points out how the kinship relations acknowl-
edged by the Crow Amerindians are at odds with genealogical connections.  
DR: We are now back to Morgan, but with an answer to his astonishment since 
we have found, as he put it “the fundamental conceptions which lie, respectively, 
at the foundation of the two original systems” (1871:14): Are siblings perceived 
through descent as the offspring of parents other than self? Or, are they perceived 
through ascent as those persons who share the same parent? 
 Even if the two individuals are genealogically connected as cousins, the second individual being the son of the 35
brother of the father of the first, the sibling relation prevails. Note that this is the case in every classificatory ter-
minology where a genealogical cousin of the same sex as the speaker on either the mother’s or the father’s side 
is called by a sibling term. 
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Read goes on to claim (2012: 24) that  
This does not mean that kinship systems are cultural constructs that determine 
kin relations in a manner independent of biological relations, but only that kinship 
terminologies are not constructed according to the logic of biological relations [ge-
nealogical, my emphasis]. 
But from what logic are they made?  
DR: The logic is that of the kin term product applied to the relations making up 
the Family Space and the kinship ideas that are part of a group’s kinship system, 
such as reciprocity of kin terms (which appears to be universal) and properties 
among primary kin terms such as ‘child’ o ‘spouse’ o ‘parent’ = ‘child’ o ’parent’ 
(cf. Lounsbury’s Half-Sibling Rule). 
If, in order to explain the extension of a number of terms from classifica-
tory terminologies to categories of relatives remote from those that the terms 
primarily refer to, we reject the appeal to particular forms of marriage that they 
are supposed to reflect; if we also reject the appeal to principles displaying circu-
larity, or to ad hoc rules having a limited explanatory value, then there only re-
mains an explanation in terms of cultural facts. Read goes to great lengths to 
demonstrate that, within the conceptual field of kinship, siblingship was decisive 
in generating the structural properties of the descriptive versus the classificatory 
kinship terminologies. What is clever and innovative is to have brought into the 
argument concepts of a non-genealogical nature along with their logical and lin-
guistic articulations, from which – also bringing into play logical constants like 
the principles of isomorphism and reciprocity – the kinship terminologies are 
built up within the cultural crucible. This theory grants a large generative and 
structural autonomy to idea systems whose owners are the culture bearers. This 
provides the explanation according to which the classificatory systems have their 
foundation in the product of the primary terms, parent and sibling (F o B = F), 
which terminologically reflects the conceptualization of sibling in terms of com-
mon parentage, but it does not answer, it seems to me, the ultimate question 
which can be formulated as follows: Why does the kinship cultural background 
of some societies includes this conception of sibling, whereas other societies in-
clude a sibling conception based on the idea that sibling is the son of father (S o 
F = B ) who is not me? (see observation 9).  
DR: Prior to my demonstration that the classificatory terminologies derive from 
having both a sibling generating term and an ascending generating term, there 
was no reason to connect classificatory terminologies with “a sibling conception 
based on shared parentage,” hence the question now posed by AM could not 
have been posed before this generative property of classificatory terminologies 
had been worked out. Even after it was worked out, it still was not immediately 
obvious that the condition for having a generating sibling term was a sibling 
conception based on shared parentage. Now that this connection has been estab-
lished, the next important research question is the one AM has posed here. Sci-
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ence, as it finds answers to old questions, forms new questions based on proper-
ties made evident by the answers to old questions.  
5. Here is another question: What is the status of the  kin term  product S o F = B, 
which expresses the idea that my brother is the son of my father who is not me, 
and, within the classificatory system, what, if anything, can actually be its con-
text of use, knowing that this is not the sibling conception that culture bearers 
have in those circumstances? I say this because, as we shall see in Observation 8 
below, Read uses this equation for reducing the  kin term  product, S o S o F o F 
o	F, from a classificatory system to the term father. 
DR: AM discusses further the reduction of S	o S o F o F o F in Observation 8 
and makes the important observation that including the equation F	o F o	F = F o 
F as a structural equation appears to lead to contradictions. I address both the 
reduction of S o S o F o F o F and the contradictions he observes in my reply to 
Observation 8. As for his specific question about the status of S o F = B, this 
brings to the surface the issue of single-valued versus multi-valued kin term 
products. Within the theory of abstract algebraic structures, it is usually assumed 
that operations on the set of symbols for the algebra are single-valued. This is 
not necessarily the case for genealogical products or for kin term products. Thus, 
for English speakers, the genealogical product, parent’s child, can either be ge-
nealogical brother or genealogical sister. Further, parent’s child can also be 
speaker, though this not a likely reply if someone is asked “Who is the child of 
your parents?” Or, again for English speakers, father of first-cousin-once-re-
moved is either first cousin or great aunt/great uncle. Which of these is meant 
would be determined from context. 
However, having multi-valued kin term products when generating the core 
terminology structure is unlikely due to the inherent ambiguity of multi-valued 
products, so multi-valued kin term products are more likely at the periphery of 
the terminology. For this reason, the kin term product, child of parent, is usually 
taken as referring to sibling and not to self by English speakers, thereby making 
it single-valued in practice. Since sibling is not a primary kin term for English 
speakers, it is reasonable to exclude self as a possible value for a kin term prod-
uct such as child of parent.  
The situation with classificatory terminologies is more complex since ‘sib-
ling’ is a primary kin term and so the kin term product, ‘son’ of ‘father,’ must be 
(male) self. But for culture bearers with classificatory terminologies, ‘son’ of ‘fa-
ther’ can also be ‘ascending brother’/’descending brother.’ Yet it does not seem 
likely that any terminology has kin term products of primary kin terms, such as 
‘son’ of ’father’ that are multi-valued. The solution to this seeming anomaly, 
where ‘son’ of ‘father’ needs to be (male) self as part of the generating logic of 
the terminology, and ‘son’ of ‘father’ needs to also be ‘ascending brother’/’de-
scending brother’ from the perspective of the use of the terminology, can be found 
by recognizing that the generation of the ascending structure involves two steps.  
The first step is the generation of the lineal structure by first generating 
the lineal ascending structure using the generating set {I, F} ,then adding the de-
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scending lineal structure using the generating set {I, S}, along with the structural 
equation S o F = I and the reciprocal equation F o S = I. In the second step, the 
ascending collateral structure is formed by augmenting the generating set with 
the primary ascending sibling generating term B+ and with the primary descend-
ing sibling generating term B-. Here, the equation S o F = B+/B- is introduced, 
making the kin term product, S o F, multi-valued. In the context of lineal rela-
tions, S o F = I and in the context of collateral relations S o F = B+/B. The de-
fault context is that of lineal relations, hence from the perspective of generating a 
terminology, S o F = I. Consequently, S o S o F o F o F = S o (S o F) o F o	F = S 
o I o F o	F = S o F o	F = I o F = F.  
6. I also wonder if the demonstration pertaining to the generation of a (classificato-
ry) system will still be valid if it starts with descending generations. Is there any 
compelling reason why generating a kinship terminology should start with the 
ascending kin terms ? Suppose we start with the descending terminological gen-
erating set (i.e., the generating set for the core descending structure) composed of 
male self (E), descending brother (B-) and son (S), and the equations S o S = GS, 
S o S o S = GGS = S o S (thus = GS if applicable), B- o B- = B-, and B- o S = S, 
which has for its reciprocal F o B+ = F. However, the equation S o B- = S, the 
son of my younger brother I call son, that appeared when starting with the as-
cending generators as the descending equation isomorphic to the ascending equa-
tion F o B+ = F, the father of my elder brother I call father, can only be intro-
duced as an axiomatic equation; that is to say, as an unexplained given, a cultural 
given reflecting the way people interpret filiation. This outcome is a little frus-
trating.  
DR: The core ascending structure is generated from the set of ascending generat-
ing terms and the core descending structure is isomorphic to the ascending struc-
ture. Since isomorphism is symmetric, if the core descending core structure is 
isomorphic to the core ascending structure, then the reverse is true as well: the 
core ascending structure is isomorphic to the core descending structure. Thus, 
one can begin by either generating the core ascending structure or the descend-
ing core structure and the combined ascending-descending structure will be the 
same in both cases. AM argues, though, that the equation S o	B- = S would have 
to be introduced axiomatically if one begins by generating the core descending 
structure. He correctly recognizes that, when starting by generating the ascend-
ing structure, the equation F o B = F (‘father’ of ‘brother’ is ‘father’) is intro-
duced as a kinship idea regarding how the ‘father’ term relates to the ‘brother’ 
term. In contrast, when starting by first generating the descending structure, the 
descending equation, S o B- = S, is not an a priori kinship idea, but is instead a 
property to be derived, if at all, through the generative logic of the terminology. 
Initially, then, when generating the core descending structure, the equation S o 
B- = S is not part of the descending structure that is being generated. In the next 
step, when the ascending structure is introduced, then (and as AM observes), 
from the equation B- o	S = S that is part of the descending structure, and via 
reciprocity, the ascending equation, F o B+ = F, is introduced. But by the re-
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quirement of isomorphism between the core descending structure and the core 
ascending structure, the isomorphic version of the equation F o B+ = F must be 
part of the descending structure, hence S o	B- = S must be part of the descending 
structure. Consequently, there is no need to axiomatically introduce the equation 
S o B- = S into the descending structure since it will be part of the combined de-
scending-ascending structure that is being generated. 
7. Read (2007: 14, 21) specifies that generating a classificatory kinship terminology 
involves, both in the ascending and descending structures, generating all possible 
kin term products from the system’s primary terms. In the masculine ascending 
structure, whose generating set is myself (E), father (F) and elder brother (B+), 
we also have the equations: F o B+ = F and F o F = F o F o	F that reduce the kin 
term products F o	B+ and F o F o F. As we can see, there is one product that is 
not reduced by a structural equation, namely B+ o F. A structural equation that 
reduces this kin term product only appears, indirectly, at the end of the structural 
demonstration. Why is the result of this equation B+ o F = F (the elder brother of 
father is a father) not also considered as axiomatic, hence a cultural given with-
out explanation? In (6), the equation S o	B- = S has to be introduced axiomatical-
ly, so why cannot this also happen here? The demonstration is supposed to con-
clude that there is no need to axiomatically introduce this equation within the as-
cending structure because it logically results from the isomorphic reversal of an 
equation, followed by its structural reciprocal, which is to say from an entirely 
structural process. I confess experiencing some difficulty in admitting this solu-
tion. 
DR: The concerns expressed in this observation have already been answered by 
my comments in Observation 6 indicating why the equation S o	B- = S is not in-
troduced axiomatically. Absent axiomatic introduction of the equation S o	B- = S, 
there is no reason to ask why the equation B+ o	F = F is not introduced axiomat-
ically, and so there is no issue as to why it is introduced since, as AM comments, 
it is introduced “from an entirely structural process.”  
8. In the last part of his article of 2018a, Resolution of the extension problem (pp. 
103-106), Dwight Read deals with the problem of the extension of a term – the 
example chosen is father – referring to a relation in the direct ascending line to 
one or several collateral relationship(s). Starting from the ethnographic observa-
tion about how, in a classificatory system, the genealogical category fffss (= ffbs) 
is generally referred to as father (F), Read (2018a: 103-4) verifies that the kin 
term product corresponding to this genealogical expression, namely S o	S o F o F 
o F, built up by associating each genealogical term in the genealogical product 
fffss with the kin term it instantiates, equals father (F). This result is obtained, as 
I mentioned earlier, by doing a mathematical reduction of the  kin term  product 
to an irreducible kin term by means of the  kin term  products S o F = B and F o 
B = F. From this, Read (2018a: 104) concludes that every product (or sequence) 
of genealogical terms (or genealogical strings) in the form, f(n times)s(n – 1 
times) corresponds to a  kin term  product that reduces to F. 
 174
Read (2018a: 104) goes on: 
In a similar manner, we may determine the predicted assignments of any (emphasis 
in the original) genealogical string to a kin term by reducing the corresponding  kin 
term  product with the structural equations for generating the kinship terminology 
to a kin term K that is irreducible, then assigning the genealogical string to K. 
Read (2018a: 104) concludes that he has 
… an explanatory argument [my emphasis] (see Read 2008) for the categories of 
genealogical relations associated to the kin term in a classificatory kinship termi-
nology.  
There are, however, other ways to reduce the corresponding kin term product. It 
is possible to use the product F o F = FF in order to reduce the  kin term  product 
S	o	S o F o	F o F. Thus: 
   S o S o (F o F) o F, which can be written as 
   S o S o FF o F, which can be rewritten as 
   S o (S o FF) o F, which can be reduced using the equation S o FF = F.  
We then obtain 
   S	o	F o F, thus 
   S o FF, which equals F. 
But for a number of classificatory kinship terminologies, like the Tongan termi-
nology (Read 2018a: 93), it should be possible to reduce the kin term product 
   S o S o F o F o F  
to  
   S o S o F o F  
by virtue of the equation stating that F o F o F equals F o	F, meaning that the 
individuals (here masculine in the paternal line), situated beyond the second as-
cending generation in relation to ego, are referred to by using the paternal grand-
father term. 
S o S o F o F can be written 
S o S o FF, 
 and by the reduction of S o FF to F, we can write 
S o F, which equals B. 
The product thus reduced does not yield F, but B (B+ or B-).  
Now suppose that, like in a number of terminologies, such as the Kariera, 
a male speaker applies the same term to his genealogical paternal grandfather (ff) 
and to his grandson (ss), thus FF = SS. Then the product  
S o S o F o F  
 obtained through reduction of F o F o F to F o F would be further reduced to  
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    SS o FF. 
Provided that such a product exists, its result would also be elder brother (B+) or 
younger brother (B-) but not father (F). The consequence is that the equation S o 
S o F o F o F does not verify the extension of F to fffss (= ffbs), when we use the 
axiomatic equation F o F o F = FF to reduce the product S o S o F o F o F. 
DR: AM has brought to the surface what seems to be a contradiction in the reduc-
tion logic of kin term products. His argument highlights the fact that boundary 
conditions such as F o F o F = F o F need to be spelled out carefully with regard 
to how they relate to kin term product reductions. In addition, his maeli example 
illustrates that kin term nomenclature and kin term products are not simply inter-
changeable.  
Consider the latter first. Maeli is a self-reciprocal term in the Kariera ter-
minology since it is the name for both F o F and for S o S, but this does not mean 
that F o F = S o S as a consequence of the generative logic of the terminology. 
Instead, there may be reasons, outside of the generative logic of the terminology, 
why the ‘grandparent’/’grandchild’ terms are self-reciprocal, having to do with 
aspects of the kinship system other than just its generative logic. In the AKT, first-
cousin-once-removed is both the name for the kin term product C o C o C o P o P 
and for the kin term product, C o C o P o P o	P, but the generative logic of the 
terminology does not imply that C o C o C o P o P = C o C o P o P o P. The self-
reciprocity of cousin terms seems to stem from the kinship idea that the concept of 
cousin is self-reciprocal: “If I am cousin to you, then you are cousin to me.” 
For the former, as AM points out, assuming F o F o F = F o F is literally a 
structural equality leads to the contradiction that F = B+ or B-. However, AM 
(2019: personal communication) observes that while F o F is named maeli in the 
Kariera terminology, Radcliffe-Brown (1913: 154) notes, critically, that maeli is 
not only self-reciprocal, but mama (‘father’) of genealogical father’s father is re-
ferred to, by a man, as maiñga (‘son’), hence not only are F o F and S o	S named 
the same way, but F o F = S o S is a structural equation since this equation im-
plies that F o (F o F) = F o (S o S) = (F o S) o	S = I o S = S. Nonetheless, for il-
lustrative purposes regarding boundary conditions, and since F o F o F is, in fact, 
named the same as F o F in some classificatory terminologies, let us assume tem-
porarily that F o F o F is named maeli. With this assumption, the boundary condi-
tion is that mama o maeli = maeli, not that structurally F o F o F = F o F. Thus, 
writing F o F o F = F o F for the boundary condition should be read as meaning 
that these two kin term products are named the same way, not that there is a struc-
tural equivalence. Hence, F o F o	F = F o F, as a boundary condition, does not 
literally mean that the product F o F o	F is the same as the product F o F, but 
only that, in the case where F o F and F o F o F have the same kin term name, the 
kin term that is the name of these two products is mapped back onto itself when 
taking the kin term product of ‘father’ with that kin term.  
In a situation where the products of the generating term F with itself are 
all named the same way, this can be graphed by a diagram like the following: 
I → F → F o F → F o F o F → . . . . 
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male mama  maeli  maeli  …  
self 
Consequently, to reduce the product S o S o F o F o F = S o (S o (F o F o F)) = S 
o (S o maeli), it is the kin term product, S o S o	maeli = SS o maeli, that we need 
to reduce, but to do this we first need to know which maeli we are referring to. Are 
we referring to maeli as the name of F o F o F, or to maeli as the name of F o F, 
or … ? For the first of these, SS o maeli = mama, but for the latter, SS o maeli = 
kaja or margara. The fact that maeli is the name for F o F o F and maeli is the 
name for F o F does not mean, then, that we can replace F o F o F by F o F (or 
vice-versa) since this substitution involves the syntax of the product S o S o F o	F 
o F, whereas naming two kin term products the same way relates to the semantics 
of the kin terms. 
Now consider the actual Kariera situation where F o F = S o S and so F o 
F o F = S (male speaking). AM (2019: personal communication) shows the fol-
lowing reduction: 
S o S o F o F o F = S o S o S  
 = F o F o S 
 = FF o S  
 = F. 
Thus, the genealogical relation fffss is included in the category of genealogical 
relations associated with the kin term mama (‘father’).  
Now consider the genealogical relation ffss. It follows that ffss  (S o S) o 
(F o F) = SS o FF. However, whereas SS o	FFF is equal to F and so is single-val-
ued, SS o FF is multi-valued and can either be equal to I or to B, hence SS o FF = 
[I, B]; that is, SS o FF is a covering term for both I and B, where B = [B+, B-]. It 
follows that [I, B] is instantiated by the set of males who share the same parents, 
namely those persons instantiated as male self, ascending brother of male self or 
descending brother of male self. This means that [I, B] can be viewed as a formal 
way to express (in the case of male siblings) Radcliffe’s idea of the Equivalence of 
Siblings. Hence the Equivalence of Siblings is equivalent to viewing siblings as 
those persons who share the same parents, and since the latter leads to the classi-
ficatory terminologies, we now have a formal argument relating Radcliffe-Brown’s 
idea of the Equivalence of Siblings to classificatory terminologies, a connection 
that was lacking in his argument for relating the Equivalence of Siblings to classi-
ficatory terminologies. 
Finally, we can map ffss to kin term categories using the reduction S o S o 
F o F = SS o FF = [I, B]. Since in the Kariera terminology B corresponds to a 
covering term for kaja or margara, it follows that the genealogical relation ffss is 
mapped to each of the genealogical categories associated with kaja and margara, 
respectively. 
9. It is the assumption that the terminologies are neither directly reflecting the actu-
al family structures nor the descendance that results from them, as well as the 
→
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dismissal – as an explanatory principle – of the extension and equivalence rules 
developed by Scheffler and Lounsbury, that prompted Read to seek an answer 
from the internal logic of the terminologies themselves, and ultimately to explain 
the structural forms of the descriptive and classificatory systems as resulting 
from cultural conceptions regarding the sibling relationship (the two conceptions 
that are described above). The question that arises, invariably, is to understand 
the reasons why a given culture developed one conception rather than the other, 
knowing also that the number of classificatory terminologies in the world’s cul-
tures far exceeds the number of descriptive ones. Another question is to wonder if 
the options that are observed within contemporary cultures may have been sub-
ject to change in a more or less remote past. This is not, apparently, Read’s first 
option. In his article from 2007 (p. 25), he puts forward the idea that there can be 
no transformation from a descriptive terminology to a classificatory terminology 
and vice versa that is founded on adjunction or suppression of structural equa-
tions:  
For this reason, descriptive and classificatory terminologies are both logically and 
structurally distinct. Any historical/evolutionary account of kinship terminologies 
will require at least (emphasis added) two root terminologies and not a single root 
terminology as the terminology from which all other terminologies are derived.  36
(note added) 
I emphasize “at least” because Read does not preclude the possibility that new 
researches will lead to the discovery of new structural forms. 
This view prompts me to make the following observations. Comparative 
linguistics is a powerful instrument allowing semantic and phonetic reconstruc-
tion of the kinship terminologies from linguistic families in their proto-stage and, 
potentially, to determine their form in remote periods. It thus appears plausible to 
contemplate the existence of classificatory terminologies during the proto-stages 
of a number of language families – Morgan predicted this a long time ago – and 
to show how the terminologies from modern languages derive from anterior ter-
minologies, and along their respective linguistic branches – some of them known 
from written documents – they have terminologically, phonetically and semanti-
cally (structurally) shifted away from the ancestral terminology. This is a task 
that a number of anthropologists with linguistic expertise or linguists with an-
thropological expertise have set for themselves. Another, vastly more complex 
task, is to show why they have made these structural shifts. 
This view of a general orderliness needs to be evaluated against the re-
sults reached by recent anthropo-linguistic studies that generally point out the 
existence of a classificatory stage during the proto-phase of a number of linguis-
tic families, followed by a more or less clear cut evolution of a number of 
branches and languages belonging to these families towards descriptive forms. 
Let me quote Kryukov’s article (1998) about the evolution of the kinship termi-
nologies from some Chinese dialects that highlight the Dravidian character of the 
 Contra Nicholas Allen, who predicts an evolution of the kinship terminologies stemming from an ancestral 36
tetradic model. To develop this issue further would lead us too far astray. I refer the reader to his articles of 1989, 
1998 and 2008. Read (2007: 25), by arguing that the studies of terminological structures are not yet completed, 
leaves the door open to the possibility that fundamental (ancestral) terminological structures need not be limited 
to the descriptive and the classificatory systems.
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archaic Chinese kinship terminology (ca. 3.000 BP), along with a transformation 
of these Chinese dialectical terminologies towards a form coined “bifurcate col-
lateral,” displaying, at the parental generation, the FB ≠ F ≠ MB and MZ ≠ M ≠ 
FZ equations.  
DR: Kryukov (1998) observes that there is extensive documentation for the Chi-
nese kinship terminology for the past 3,000 years. He points out that the Erya 
language vocabulary, dating back to 1,000 BC, includes kin terms such as sheng 
whose genealogical referents include fzs, mbs, wb and zh, which matches precise-
ly the structural diagram shown in Read (2010a: Figure 11) derived through 
working out the generative logic of a Dravidian terminology. The generative log-
ic establishes that a prescribed ‘cross-cousin’ marriage is structurally necessary 
when joining together a consanguineal and an affinal structure to form a com-
plete Dravidian kinship terminology. Kryukov goes on to observe that while the 
genealogical equations f = fb, m = mz, wf = mb and wm = fz that are part of a 
classificatory terminology would have been present in a Dravidian terminology 
ancestral to the Erya terminology, the Erya terminology is transitional, he ar-
gues, since it has different terms referring to f and fb, to m and mz, to wf and mb, 
and to wm and fz. Missing, though, in his argument (and missing in general in 
arguments regarding historical changes in the terms making up a kinship termi-
nology [Read 2013]) is how these changes in equations would arise from modifi-
cation of the generative logic of the terminology.  
To see how these changes from a classificatory terminology relate to mod-
ification in the generative logic of a terminology, consider first that the kin term 
product equations F o W = B o	M and M o W = (Z o F) from which the ge-
nealogical equations wf = mb and wm = fz are derived, are introduced in the last 
step of the generative logic when joining together a consanguineal structure and 
an affinal structure in order to form a single, complete terminology (see Read 
2010a for details). This implies that the equations F o W = B o M and M o W (Z 
o F) would not be introduced if the generative logic does not include the last step 
in the generation of a Dravidian terminology, and this would leave intact the 
generative logic of the terminology except for the last step in that generative log-
ic.  
However, the removal of the equations F = B o F and M = Z o M from a 
Dravidian terminology occurs at a deep structural level and requires redefining 
the sibling relation as no longer being a primary kinship relation. In effect, it 
would essentially require replacing the generative logic of a classificatory termi-
nology with the generative logic of a descriptive terminology and this, on the face 
of it, does not seem plausible. 
Alternatively, the equations F = B o F and M = Z o M that, according to 
Kryukov, were part of a posited classificatory terminology ancestral to the Erya 
terminology, may have been introduced in the same manner as these equations 
are introduced into the Fanti terminology even though the terminology is based 
on the generative logic for a descriptive terminology (see my comments below for 
details). This, coupled with using the same procedure for joining together a con-
sanguineal and an affinal structure as occurs with a Dravidian terminology (see 
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Read 2010a for details), would give rise to the prescriptive ‘cross-cousin’ mar-
riage rule required for the properties of the ancestral terminology. What would 
be absent from the ancestral terminology are terms translated as ‘elder brother/
sister’ and ‘younger brother/sister’. 
Next, Kryukov points out that around 200 AD the kin term sheng no 
longer referred to fbs and mbs, hence there was no longer a term whose transla-
tion would be ‘cross-cousin.’ This is consistent with the Fanti terminology, as it 
also lacks kin terms for ‘cross-cousin’ (Kronenfeld 2009 [1980]). Lastly, Kryukov 
notes that by the time of the third to fifth centuries AD, the terminology would 
now be classified as a bifurcate collateral terminology like the present-day Chi-
nese terminology, and not as a Dravidian terminology.  
The historical account for the Chinese terminology, then, shows the need 
to bring the historical linguistic argument into accord with the structural logic of 
the terminologies in question, and by doing so, a fuller and richer account of the 
historical changes in a kinship terminology will be the end result. This comment 
applies to the other examples of historical changes in terminologies discussed by 
Kryukov. However, there is one case where Kryukov’s argument has been shown 
to be incorrect. Kryukov argues that the Crow-Omaha terminologies, since they 
are asymmetric terminologies, would have been derived from an asymmetric pre-
scriptive system, hence the Crow-Omaha terminologies were not derived from the 
symmetric, non-prescriptive Iroquois terminologies. However, Read (2018c) 
demonstrates that what Lounsbury (1965) considers to be the archetype of the 
Crow and Omaha terminologies derives in a straightforward manner from the 
Iroquois terminology, thus showing the need to relate historical changes in ter-
minologies to the underlying generative logic of the terminologies in question.  
Kryukov (1998: 295-6, 298) also points out how the Russian and Latin 
kinship terminologies both changed from bifurcate collateral (possibly derived 
from anterior classificatory structures) towards “lineal” structures (e.g., modern 
Russian or modern French where [FB = MB] ≠ F and [MZ = FZ] ≠ M, thus in 
French oncle vs père and tante vs mère). Kryukov also demonstrates, on the 
strength of terminological surveys collected in the village of Bongu (on the Ray 
coast of New Guinea) over a period of a century, that the terminology in use in 
this region had also evolved from a classificatory structure into a bifurcate collat-
eral one. Lastly (1998: 302-310), he shows – and this is what constitutes the body 
of the article – how the terminologies from the languages (or dialects) of the Lolo 
language branch that belongs to the Sino-Tibetan family have evolved from an 
ancestral Dravidian-like system into Iroquois-like systems, or systems still close 
to the Dravidian model, by splitting affinal equations like FZ = EM = MBW and 
MB = EF = FZH in two; thus, FZ = HM, MBW = WM and MB = WF, FZH = 
HF.  
Kryukov (1998: 310-13) proposes a multilateral evolutionary direction 
from ancestral Dravidian systems that, on the one hand, evolve into Iroquois sys-
tems which, in turn, evolve into generational (Hawaiian) systems and next into 
lineal (descriptive) systems, and, on the other hand, into bifurcate collateral sys-
tems that also change ultimately towards lineal systems.  
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Other approaches have been developed in other regions of the world. 
Among these I will only mention – may all the authors not mentioned forgive me 
– the pluridisciplinary one about Aboriginal Australia, under the auspices of the 
Austkin project of whom Patrick McConvell, Laurent Dousset and Harold Koch 
are the main conceptors.  A final element that needs to be added to this discus37 -
sion is the theoretical possibility, based upon the existence of kinship terms of 
global distribution, like those referring to the parents, papa or tata, mama or 
nana, but above all kaka whose meaning ‘maternal uncle’ or ‘spouse father’ is 
remarkably recurrent worldwide, thus suggesting that all kinship terminologies of 
the world ultimately derive from one African pre-dispersal proto-terminology 
(Proto-sapiens as we coined it), whose classificatory nature leaves little doubt 
(Bancel and Matthey 2002, Matthey and Bancel 2002 etc.).  
DR: The scenario outlined by AM implies kinship terminologies based on kin 
term products being formulated around 50 – 60 kya in Africa since Homo sapi-
ens traces back to at least 50 kya in Australia. Hence, conditions that would 
have led to selection for the cognitive complexity of symbolic computational kin-
ship terminology systems must already have been in place in pre-dispersal 
Africa, yet the archaeological evidence does not suggest conditions that would 
have led to selection for complex forms of kinship systems and associated forms 
of social organization. Prior to 50 kya, there is scant evidence of a significant 
difference in the adaptation of the Homo sapiens populations in comparison with 
the Neanderthal populations in the geographical area of the Middle East, with 
the exception of the use of ochre and of shell bead necklaces by Homo sapiens 
populations. Yet the worldwide distribution of terms “referring to the parents, 
papa or tata, mama or nana, but above all kaka whose meaning ‘maternal uncle’ 
or ‘spouse father’” strongly suggests that these terms originated in pre-disper-
sal Africa.  
A solution to these two contrary lines of argument lies in the deep history 
of kinship (Read 2019). The deep history identifies the development of kinship 
terminology systems as having taken place in three phases. The first was the 
transition from the phenomenal level to the ideational level through the intro-
duction of the concept of a mothering relation between a female and her off-
spring. The second phase was the formation of a conceptual system of genealog-
ical relations based on the logic of recursion, acting initially on the concept of a 
mother relation and subsequently also on the concept of a father relation. The 
functionality at the group level that would arise through the completeness and 
consistency of a system of genealogical relations would lead to selection for the 
 The aims of the “Austkin project” (http://www.austkin.net/index.php?loc=project) is to develop a data base 37
bringing together all the kinship terms, the social category names (sections and subsections etc.) from the Abo-
riginal languages and dialects through multiple sources, old or recent, for their analysis and comparison. The 
current but necessarily incomplete result of this endeavor is summed up in the conclusion of the project itself: 
“We now have new models of past migrations, land connections and cultural change, providing fresh insights 
into how Aboriginal people have organized social interaction and created enduring societies.“ One needs to also 
mention, as one of the crucial aims of the project, the linguistic and semantic reconstruction of the kinship termi-
nology from Proto-Pama-Nyungan, an Aboriginal language family of more than 200 languages, covering almost 
three quarters of Australia.
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development of what we now refer to as the institution of marriage. The third 
phase, of introducing a symbolic computational system of kin terms, would re-
solve the conceptual complexity that arises in a system of genealogical relations 
based on the logic of recursion when extending genealogical connections hori-
zontally by tracing genealogically to conceptually more distant ancestors and 
then back to the current group members. The first phase may have developed in 
the time period from 500 – 100 kya. The second phase may have developed in 
the time period 100 – 50 kya and the third phase in the time period 50 – 30 kya. 
If so, pre-dispersal Homo sapiens would have already had a genealogical system 
of relations that they brought with them to Australia, but the third phase would 
have been worked out after their arrival in Australia. 
For the second phase, genealogical relations may have been specified, as 
occurs today, by a sequence of father-child and mother-child relations (and/or 
their reciprocals) connecting one individual to another, or some of the more fre-
quently utilized genealogical relations may have been shortened by naming 
them; e.g., by saying “He is my kaka” rather than “He is my mother’s brother.” 
The term kaka, then, may initially have gained currency among the members of a 
group of pre-dispersal Homo sapiens as the name for the mother’s brother ge-
nealogical relation even though no symbolic system of kin terms yet existed. Lat-
er, when terminologies in the form of a symbolic computational system (in place 
of, or adjunct to, a system of genealogical relations some of which were named) 
developed, the names for close genealogical relations may have been exapted as 
names for corresponding kin term products; thus, kaka as the name for the ge-
nealogical relation, mother’s brother, may been exapted as the name for the kin 
term product ‘brother’ of ‘mother’ for which the genealogical relation mother’s 
brother would be a genealogical relation, but not the only one, referred to by the 
kin term ‘brother’ of ‘mother.’  
In sum, if we follow Read, we are faced with two systems of kinship re-
lations reckoning different in their logic. One, the genealogical, is based on re-
cursive reasoning, implying parent to child sequences and reciprocally, the other, 
the terminological system, is based on the generation of kinship relations and kin 
terms through algebraic computing of kin terms. Everyone agrees that neither of 
the two system needs the other in order to be operative. But between the two of 
them, though, there are gateways, allowing us, as Read says, to instantiate the 
kinship terms with genealogical relations; that is to say, to bring out the possible 
corresponding genealogical categories, and the concrete individuals who incar-
nate them. 
Another fact appears – and it appeared to Morgan at the dawn of his 
quest –, namely that kinship relations, defined through kin term products and 
embodied through the terms themselves, may look absurd in view of genealogi-
cal calculations. Morgan says as much. In view of the “nature of descent,” the 
genealogical absurdity can be seen in calling father someone who your paternal 
grand-uncle (your genealogical ffb) calls son (S	o	B o F o F = F), or calling, like 
the male Crow Amerindians do (see Read 2012: 24), father someone who their 
sisters call son (S o Z = F).  
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Yet another important point. Although very different in terms of logic, 
the two computing spaces –here I borrow Read’s phrasing – have a common 
conceptual basis. Both “derive” (Read et al. 2014) from positions and relations 
of the family space formed through the primary relations that are fundamental to 
all kinship relations. Up to this point, Read and colleagues remain faithful to 
Morgan. But the latter conceived this “derivation” in terms of kinship terms that 
reflect (or refer to) relations that are real, such as the family relations determined 
by descendance from the married parents. From this he explained the gap be-
tween the terminological results of kin term products and of genealogical tracing 
(based on the nature of descent founded on the nuclear family, as it exists in a 
vast majority of societies), by the fact that the terminological order reflects a 
state of affairs belonging to a remote past. Thus, from a state of affairs where the 
family and the kinship relations stemming from it were different from what they 
are nowadays. Read for his part, explains that the terminological structure has an 
indirect relationship with its base. It derives from it, but it is not its exact reflec-
tion, only a culturally interpreted reflection. 
Read provides a model for the family space (or structure), with a “nu-
clear” form, from which primary relations result, conceived from the self point 
of view. He acknowledges that the concrete forms that the family may take can 
be very different in practice, according to the culturally favored type of instanti-
ation of the positions existing in the familial model (structure) of a given society, 
like a multiplicity of individuals susceptible to being assigned to each position. 
Insofar as the primary relations are modeled after procreative and affinal con-
ceptions, the content for the relations of father, mother (parents), wife, husband 
(spouse), daughter, son (child), sister and brother (sibling) will reflect the type of 
instantiation particular to a given society. Read even includes the theoretical 
possibility of group-marriage, but this is just mentioned in passing. At the level 
of spouse relations, the only instantiations that are subject to consensus are 
monogamous, polygynous, and polyandrous ties, with the last ones being mostly 
of the fraternal type. There is no systematic connection between a form of mar-
riage and a given type of terminology because the three named marriage vari-
eties can occur, either all together or separately, in societies having either a de-
scriptive or a classificatory terminology. There is no a priori causal relationship 
between one particular type of instantiation (one type of marriage) and one par-
ticular type of kinship terminology because all that counts, according to the au-
thor, is how primary relations are conceptualized in a given culture, notably the 
sibling relationship. 
Two questions are relevant here. The first one relates to the conditions 
that motivated the different ways of conceptualizing a sibling, I already said this. 
The second is to determine whether the cultural conceptualization of sibling as 
someone sharing the same parents with the speaker -- so frequent in the world’s 
cultures -- results from a convergence process or is inherited from an ancient, 
common culture. These questions should be clarified. Admittedly, the results of 
the  kin term  product, S o B o F o F thus father (F), may appear absurd with 
regard to genealogical tracing for a family based on monogamous marriage, but 
Morgan showed that this kin term result is congruent with relations resulting 
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from the marriage between a group of brothers and a group of women (possibly 
sisters). One cannot avoid this result except by denying to “group-marriage” any 
ethnographic reality, which is what most anthropologist have done for the past 
century. This position is seemingly strengthened by arguments from the evolu-
tionary psychology perspective, pointing out the existence of a universal jeal-
ousy coupled with the imperious desire of males expressed in terms of reproduc-
tive certainty, hence for exclusive sexual access to their partner(s), which can 
only arise through monogamous or polygynous marriages. This, Warren Shapiro 
has emphasized a number of times in his publications, and in particular in his 
book about partible paternity (2009: 17). 
Another difficulty appears if we follow Read’s reasoning and consider, 
on the one hand the equation B o F = F, thus  
… the defining equation used typically to identify classificatory terminologies 
(Read 2014: 84), 
as principled, while on the other hand, we take it as derived from, or generated 
by, or as a final consequence of reciprocity, from the  kin term  product S o B = 
S, itself being isomorphic to F o B = F. How can a principle at the same time 
appear as a cause and a consequence ? 
DR: There is no difficulty. What AM refers to as the “principled” equation is the 
genealogical equation fb = f, not the kin term product equation B o F = F. The 
complete sentence from which the quote is taken reads as follows: “It also fol-
lows that margara o mama = mama, hence genealogical brother of genealogical 
father will be referred to as mama, the defining equation used typically to identi-
fy classificatory terminologies.” That is, the defining equation is: genealogical 
brother of genealogical father is genealogical father, with the latter referred to 
as mama, or, written as a genealogical equation, fb = f, where f and b are ge-
nealogical kin types.  
AM’s question highlights precisely what is at issue. The genealogical 
equation fb = f that others have taken as “principled” is obtained from a kin 
term product equation like margara o mama = mama — itself derived from per-
ceiving siblings as sharing the same parents — hence fb = f is not principled but 
derived. Further, calling it principled can be misleading. Consider the Fanti 
terminology of Ghana studied extensively by David Kronenfeld (1980 [2009]). 
The Fanti terminology is said to be a classificatory terminology due to the equa-
tions fb = f ≠ mb and mz = m ≠ fz (Kronenfeld 1980 [2009]), but it is not a clas-
sificatory terminology since it does not have two kin terms referring to ge-
nealogical same sex sibling (with the terms typically translated as ‘elder sibling’ 
and ‘younger sibling’) and can be generated without assuming a sibling gener-
ating term, thus, making it a descriptive terminology (Read n.d.). So, the equa-
tion fb = f ≠ mb (and its counterpart, mz = m ≠ fz) is better understood as a 
classificatory key, yet it is not even a satisfactory key as shown by its misclassifi-
cation of the Fanti terminology, hence the supposedly principled equation fails 
to be indicative of the structural logic of a classificatory terminology. 
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I here interrupt the reflection that Read and colleagues work have prompted me, 
hoping I wasn’t too long and I leave the floor to Dwight Read.  
DR: AM has worked carefully through what I have written about the generative 
logic of kinship terminologies being a change in paradigm and in so doing has 
explored more deeply important parts of the argument. I am pleased to see that 
AM considers the argument to have passed the muster of a careful and critical 
reading.  
AM’s comments in Observations 5 and 8 have been especially helpful and 
have led, as I indicate in my comments on those observations, to discussion of 
multi-valued kin term products in kinship terminologies and clarification of what 
is meant by a boundary equation such as F o F o F = F o F. All human groups 
have worked out conceptual boundaries of their terminology. Boundaries, in gen-
eral, relate to properties of what is being bounded and, in so doing, may intro-
duce discontinuity in system trends. In this sense, a boundary need not be a gen-
erated property but can be a property introduced to terminate further extension 
of, in the case of terminologies, the terminology through the kin term product, 
unlike genealogical relations that extend indefinitely through repeated use of the 
logic of recursion. 
I now go back to the ideas of Lewis Henry Morgan for a moment to see 
how my paradigm change relates to his ideas about the source for the descriptive 
and classificatory terminologies. Morgan assumed kinship relations arise either 
through reproduction or through marriage, but the former contradicts, as he real-
ized with the Seneca terminology, the structural distinction between lineal and 
collateral genealogical relations arising through reproduction. He then hypothe-
sized a marriage rule – marriage of a group of brothers with a group of sisters – 
to account for classificatory terminologies like the Seneca terminology. In so do-
ing, Morgan was developing a theory: given his assumptions, if reproduction is 
not the source of the relations making up the classificatory terminologies, then 
they must have arisen through marriage. 
The subsequent empirical rejection of Morgan’s hypothesized marriage 
rule negated marriage as the source for the problematic kin terms in the classifi-
catory terminologies, thus implying that the assumption of kinship relations aris-
ing through reproduction is also not tenable. What the latter has required for its 
resolution, though, is not David Schneider’s (1984) rejection of kinship as a legit-
imate domain of study, but a change in paradigm, as discussed in Read 2007 (see 
also Read et al. 2014, Leaf and Read 2012), that has made it possible to identify, 
as Morgan put it, “the fundamental conceptions which lie, respectively, at the 
foundation of the two original systems” (1871:14). 
We now know, through the change in the ontology for kinship relations 
(discussed on page 43) upon which the paradigm change is based, what those 
fundamental conceptions are: Are siblings perceived through descent as the off-
spring of parents other than self, or through ascent as those persons who share 
the same parent? The former leads to terminologies that keep the lineal kin term 
line distinct from the collateral kin term lines, at least for the central kin term 
generations. The latter leads to classificatory terminologies with their kin term 
 185
relations that crosscut the genealogical structure arising from reproduction. This 
theoretical result has been verified empirically (see Witowski 1972; Dziebel 
2007: 133).  
As AM discusses, the next step in this paradigm change is, as he suggests, 
to ask: Why this difference in how siblings are conceptualized? Part of the an-
swer is made evident through a deep history of kinship systems (Read 2019; see 
also Trautmann 2011) that considers the functionality arising from, and the adap-
tive consequences of, the different ways that sibling relations have been embed-
ded into the social fabric of small scale human societies. Another part relates to 
the evolutionary transition from the face-to-face form of social organization of an 
ancestral primate to the relation-based forms of social organization that charac-
terize human societies (Read 2012) that played itself out through the evolution of 
systematic, symbolic systems of kin relations, likely beginning with a mother rela-
tion based on primate mothering behaviors (see Read 2010b for details).   38
The questions AM is asking exemplify science at its best. As answers to 
one set of questions are worked out, we are led to ask new questions whose con-
tent derives from the answers to those earlier questions. His questions also show 
that the formalism associated with the paradigm change, rather than taking us 
away, as some might suppose, from understanding ourselves in a humanistic 
sense, leads us to consider another aspect of what it means for us to be humans, 
namely the reasons we have different ways to conceptualize the kin relations such 
as the sibling kin relations. Our ancestors worked out these ideas as they dealt 
with pragmatic problems relating to both their interaction with external, ecologi-
cal and physical environments from which the resources needed for survival are 
obtained, and to their internal social environments in which the social relations 
of one individual to another are conceptualized and worked out. Our ancestors, 
from around 50+ kya, had the genius to work out a system of kinship relations, 
not on the basis of categorization of external phenomena, but by symbolically 
creating a conceptual system of kin relations that are fundamental to what it 
means to be human. This had to be a conceptual system that could generate – 
drawing upon, but not directed by, the realities of biological reproduction – a 
system of interconnected relations that made it possible for group members to 
conceptualize their identity as a group in a way that transcends our biological 
heritage. The question AM asks, “Why this difference in how siblings are concep-
tualized,” draws our attention to what are the conceptual systems that we have 
created for ourselves and define for us what it means to be human. Thus, the title, 
How Culture Makes Us Human, of my book setting forth what I see as the evolu-
tionary trajectory, through kinship, from our primate ancestors to our perception 
of ourselves as humans. 
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